Strategic Resources of Iraq, Turkey and Iran and the Development of Kurdish Nationalism: The Domestic, Regional and International Context by Hawley, K. M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
Strategic resources of Iraq
Hawley, K. M.










STRATEGIC RESOURCES OF IRAQ, TURKEY AND
IRAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KURDISH





Thesis Advisor: Ralph H. Magnus




SECURITY CLASSIFICATION! OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved0MB No 0704-0188
la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
nNCTASSIFIEn
lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER{S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS {City. State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (Gfy, State, and Z/P Code;
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









^hTRA'^E(^iV^M^S'6^&:^^''hF IRAQ, TURKEY, AND IRAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
KURDISH NATIONALISM: THE DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Hawley, K.M.









The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the offi-
cial policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
17 COSATI CODES
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP
18 SUBJECT TERMS {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block numtter)
Kurdistan; Kurds; Iran; Iraq; Turkey;
Strategic Resources
19 ABSTRACT {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This research examines the strategic resources of Iraq, Turkey and
Iran with particular emphasis on those assets found in the Kurdish regions
of these nations. Strategic resources, in the context of this discussion,
are defined as oil and nonfuel mineral assets and agricultural potential,
to include degree of soil productivity and availability of water supplies.
To the extent applicable, industrial development is discussed as well.
Kurdish history, language and culture and the Kurdish nationalist movement
in the three nations are also examined. Superpower and regional interests
in the Kurdish nationalist movement and the governments of the nations
involved are also addressed.
20 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
H UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT Q DTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Prof. Ralph H. Magnus
3D Form 1473. JUN 86




Previous editions are obsolete
S/N 0102-LF-014-6603
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Strategic Resources of Iraq, Turkey and Iran and the
Development of Kurdish Nationalism: The Domestic,
Regional and International Context
by
K.M. Hawley
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A. , Emmanuel College, 1981
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This research examines the strategic resources of Iraq,
Turkey and Iran with particular emphasis on those assets
found in the Kurdish regions of these nations. Strategic
resources, in the context of this discussion, are defined as
oil and nonfuel mineral assets and agricultural potential,
to include degree of soil productivity and availability of
water supplies. To the extent applicable, industrial
development is discussed as well. Kurdish history, language
and culture and the Kurdish nationalist movement in the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The three nations—Iran, Iraq, and Turkey—which contain
the significant portion of the area sometimes called
Kurdistan are vastly different from one another. Not only
are their forms of government distinct, they are ethnically,
and within a Muslim context, religiously different as well.
National security as well as regional and international
relations in these three nations have been complicated by
the Kurdish issue in varying degrees. In each country, the
dimension of the dispute differs and the governmental
approach to the problem varies.
The focus of this presentation concentrates upon the
strategic resources in the Kurdish areas of Iran, Iraq and
Turkey, and explores the possibility of the existence of a
relationship between the concentration or exploitation of
resources in Kurdish areas and the level of Kurdish-
government strife as a whole. Strategic resources, in the
context of this discussion, are primarily energy assets such
as oil and hydroelectric potential, and agricultural assets,
such as arable land, animal husbandry and river systems. To
the extent that they apply, nonfuel mineral assets will be
discussed as well.
II. OVERVIEW OF HISTORY. LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
The Kurds are a fiercely independent, racially
homogenous group who are believed to be the descendants of
Indo-European tribes which settled in the Zagros mountains
over 4000 years ago.-'- The inhospitality and inaccessibility
of this mountain region served as an effective barrier to
the influence of other groups and facilitated the
development of a separate and distinct cultural identity.
^
Over time, as the Kurds moved northward and expanded the
area that they inhabited, contact with other cultures and
governments became inevitable. This contact led to conflict
between the autonomous, mountain-dwelling Kurds and the
governments in the plains who endeavored to extend their
influence into, and beyond, the mountain regions. The
Kurds, located as they were between the Ottomans in Turkey
and Safavids in Iran, assumed the de-facto role of "border
police" after the 1514 Battle of Chaldiran, when the
Ottomans routed the Safavids from the eastern portion of
Anatolia.-^ The 1639 Treaty of Erzerum established a firm
-'Trevor Mostyn and Albert Hourani, eds. The Cambridcfe
Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 463.
^Samande Siaband, "Mountains, My Home: An Analysis of
the Kurdish Psychological Landscape," Kurdish Times , Vol.
2, No. 2 (Summer, 1988), p. 8.
-^Mosteyn and Hourani, Cambridge Encyclopedia , p. 465.
border between the Ottomans and the Persians and resulted in
the first official division of the Kurdish population.^
However, the effect of this division was not immediately
felt by the Kurds inhabiting the buffer zone, who moved
freely within their own area.
This system worked happily until the nineteenth century,
when both the Ottomans and Qajars (Iran) extended direct
administration in the area. This triggered a series of
unsuccessful revolts until the end of the century which
demonstrated the difficulty Kurdish leaders had in working
together.
^
These unsuccessful revolts were merely the opening salvos in
an on-again, off-again war for autonomy which continues to
this day. This sense of budding nationalism has been
alternatively encouraged and discouraged by those who have
sought their own advantage in the context of Kurdish efforts
for self-determination.
Linguistically, the Kurds are less homogenous. Most
texts separate the Kurds into two main dialects, Kurman j
i
and Sorani, the former being the primary dialect of the
north and the latter of the south, and make reference to the
sub-dialects of Zaza (primarily spoken in Dersim, now
Tunceli, Turkey) , and the Iranian sub-dialects of Leki,
^Donald Bruce Disney, Jr, The Kurdish Nationalist
Movement and External Influences . Master's Thesis for Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1980. p. 14.
^Mostyn and Hourani, Cambridge Encyclopedia , p. 4 65.
Gurani, and Kermanshahi . ^ However, one author disputes the
use of the word "dialects" to describe what he instead terms
Kurdish "languages" which possess "the phonetic and
syntactic variations among them, (which) are as pronounced
as, for example, those between Italian, Catalan, Spanish and
Portuguese."^ This distinction between Kurdish "languages"
as opposed to "dialects" is significant and doubtless is a
serious stumbling block to cooperative efforts geared
towards fostering a Kurdish national identity. Further, the
lack of a single script makes written communications
difficult across national boundaries. "Roman letters are
used in Turkey and Syria; Cyrillic in the USSR; and Arabic
in Iraq and Iran—hardly a unifying factor."^
Culturally, the Kurds possess a tribal heritage with
nomadic roots. This heritage is more evident today amongst
the mountain Kurds, exerting less influence on those living
in the plains and urban areas. As a result of migration to
the urban areas in search of either seasonal or permanent
^Mostyn and Hourani, Cambridge Encyclopedia , p. 464.
The dividing line separating the two main dialects is
described a,s "(1) Kurmanji, spoken northwards as far as the
USSR from a line drawn roughly from Mosul across to Urmiya;
(2) Sorani (or Kurdi) , spoken roughly southwards from Urmiya
to Khanaqin in the south on both sides of the Iran/Iraq
border. In Iraq the Kurds are thus divided between the two
major dialect groups."
^Mehrdad Izady, "A Kurdish Lingua Franca?" Kurdish
Times . Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer, 1988, pp. 13, 14.
^Richard Sim, Kurdistan; The Search for Recognition ,
(London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980)
, p.
2.
employment, the importance of tribalism is waning.^ The
degree of tribalism is a function, to some extent, of the
language spoken. Sorani speakers tend to emphasize tribal
relations to a greater degree than Kurman j i speakers, and
Sorani is the language used for most intellectual
discussions. Kurmanj i speakers are sometimes regarded by
their Sorani speaking brothers as less culturally
sophisticated, although their fighting prowess is admired.
Kurmanj is, on the other hand, often regard Sorani speakers
as "unmanly, unreliable, and culturally arrogant . "-^^
Nomadism, once the mainstay of Kurdish society, is now
almost a thing of the past.
Following the partition of Kurdistan, the new
frontiers, especially that between Turkey and Iran,
prevented the traditional summer and winter migrations.
The semi-nomads were stripped of the right to cross the
frontiers. In some cases the lines of the frontier cut
tribes into two or even three groups. .. .Certain factors
did delay the sedentarization of the Kurdish nomads: the
climate was favourable to stockrearing and the grazing was
good, there was a shortage of irrigated land, and the
tribes preferred to live an independent life without any
obligations to the state. But eventually, as the state
consolidated the centralization, nomadism faded out.-^-'-
Most Kurds are Muslims, with the majority adhering to
the Sunni sect. Significant numbers of Shia Kurds are found
in Iran near Kermanshah. Also, in northern Iran are found
^Mostyn and Hourani, Cambridge Encyclopedia , p. 4 64.
^^Martin van Bruinessen, "The Kurds Between Iran and
Iraq," Middle East Report , July-August 1986, p. 16.
^Gerard Chaliand, ed., People Without a Country; The
Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1980), p. 115.
Kurds "who are Ali-Ilahi, a sect even farther from the Sunni
creed than the Shia. . . . "-'^ In addition, some Kurds are
Zoroastrian Yezidis.-^-^
The mountain-dwelling Kurds tend to be taller and more
fit than their Arab, Persian and Turkish neighbors, and are
often blue-eyed with light-colored skin. Their clothing is
designed for comfort and utility. One author described
traditional Kurdish dress as follows:
It consisted of baggy trousers secured at the ankle
(although Barzan trousers, were "flared" at the bottoms)
,
a cummerbund or heavy leather belt, shirt, longish jacket
frequently embroidered. . .and a turban, the colour, fringe,
or mode of wearing often denoting the individual tribe.
The men invariably wore... a curved dagger... and a weapon,
even an ancient firearm, was carried as a prized prestige
accessory ... .Kurdish women were not veiled and wore
traditional dress of their own.-'-'*
The Kurds have historically resisted subjugation or
taxation by force of arms. As a result, they have earned a
reputation as fierce and fearless fighters.
-^^Hassan Arfa, The Kurds; An Historical and Political
Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 27.
-'-•^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 3.




III. POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KURDS
"Kurdistan" cannot be found on most present-day maps,
and even among students of history and culture there is some
disagreement as to the boundaries of the country that
Kurdish nationalists seek to establish. Due to population
shifts over the years, Kurds have settled in significant
numbers in areas as diverse as Lebanon and West Germany, far
from their ancestral home. However, the area known as
Kurdistan can broadly be described as follows:
A beautiful, mountainous land beginning in the east
near Lake Rezaiyeh at the slopes of the Zagros mountains,
Kurdistan stretches southeast roughly halfway between
Sanandaj and Hamadan in Iran and passes westwards through
the oil-rich Kirkuk region of Iraq—where the Kurds have
had their longest and bloodiest struggle—towards Malatya
in Turkey. From there the region is bounded to the north
by the high mountainous chain of Mercan Dag and Harhal
Dag, which forms a natural boundary between the Turks and
the Kurds. 15
Five countries possess significant Kurdish populations.
An accurate assessment of the population is impossible to
obtain, due to a tendency by Kurdish nationalists to
increase the estimates, while governments are often
l^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 1.
motivated to reduce them. Approximate population figures^^
are as follows.
Turkey : Estimates range between four and almost nine
million, depending on the source consulted. Although
scattered across Anatolia, the bulk of these individuals
live in the southeast, in the area east of a line drawn
between Gaziantep and Erzican. Thus, Kurds constitute
anywhere from slightly more than seven to almost 17 percent
of the population.
Iran: Estimates vary from two and one-half to more than
five million Kurds, the bulk of whom live along Iran's
western border in the Zagros Mountain region. Based on
current population figures, Kurds in Iran comprise between
four and ten percent of the total population.
Iraq : Estimates range between two and one-half to three
million persons, the bulk of whom live in the northern
portion of the country, and to the east of the Tigris River.
Thus, the Kurdish population is between 14 and 17 percent of
the total population.
Syria : Small pockets of Kurds exist north of Aleppo and
near Cizre on the Syrian Turkish border. These number from
approximately 600,000 to more than 800,000. As a percentage
-'^Kurdish population estimates derived from Sim,
Kurdistan
, p. 3; Middle East Reports , July-August, 198 6, p.
21; and Chaliand, People Without a Country , pp. 108, 211,
222; Country population totals from PCGLOBE PLUS (Comwell
Systems Inc: Tempe, Arizona, 1989), as follows: Iran:
51.9 million; Iraq: 17.6 million; Turkey: 54.2 million;
Syria: 11.6 million; USSR: 286.4 million.
of the total , Kurds make up between five and seven percent
of the population.
USSR ; Kurdish communities are found in Armenia, Georgia
and Azerbaijan. Population estimates range from 200,000 to
slightly under 300,000, only a fraction of a percent of the
total population.
In Iraq, the reorganization and renaming of the
administrative boundaries (provinces) make it difficult to
determine which provinces are "Kurdish" and which are not.
The provinces of Suleymanieh, Arbil and Dehok comprise what
is officially termed the "autonomous region" of Kurdistan;
however, significant populations of Kurds live in Kirkuk,
Nineveh (Mosul), Badinan and Wasit. Government
"arabization" efforts have altered the present population
distribution in the areas historically inhabited by Kurds. '^
In Turkey, the Kurdish population comprises a majority
or a significant minority in some 18 vilayets in the eastern
portion of the country. These include Adiyaman, Agri,
Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Erzincan, Erzurum,
Gaziantep, Hakkari, Kars, Malatya, Mus, Mardin, Siirt,
Tunceli, Urfa, and Van. In addition, there are significant
pockets of Kurds in the vilayets of Sivas and Maras.^^
In Iran, the Kurds inhabit a region which spans several
provinces. The population is centered in Kurdistan, but
I'^Chaliand, People Without a Country , pp. 154-156.
l^Chaliand, People Without a Country , p. 102.
also inhabits Western Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and to some
extent Luristan as well. Additionally, some 400,000 Kurds
reside in the towns of Gutshan and Dorgaz in Khorrasan
province. ^^
Map 1 shows the area where Kurds have existed
historically in large numbers, and which is generally viewed
as the historical boundaries of Kurdistan. Kurdish
nationalists might argue with the dimensions of the
boundaries shown, and the governments of Iran, Iraq and
Turkey would want it pointed out that these nonexistent
boundaries encroach upon their sovereign territories.
Nonetheless, the map provides the reader with a general idea
of the area under discussion.
l^Chaliand, People Without a Country , pp. 107-108
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IV. IRAQ
A. OVERVIEW OF GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES: LAND AND WATER
ASSETS
Iraq is geophysically located on the Arabian Plate,
which is bordered to the north by the Turkish plate and to
the north-east by what is termed the "Zagros Crush" or
"Zagros Thrust" zone. This zone separates the Arabian Plate
from the Central/Eastern Iranian Plate and runs from Turkey
along the Zagros Mountain range. As the Arabian Plate
pushes to the north, earthquakes are frequently felt in the
Zagros Crush Zone. This zone bisects the region commonly
termed Kurdistan. The Iraqi portion of Kurdistan is located
in the north east corner of the country, and suffers a
significantly disproportionate amount of earthquake activity
in comparison to the remainder of that country. ^^
The general climate in Iraq is especially harsh in the
summer months, with temperatures ranging from 9 5 to 12
degrees fahrenheit. In the evenings, near rivers and in the
mountain regions the temperatures are somewhat cooler.
Because of the direction of the summer winds, termed "Shamal
winds" which blow across the desert towards the Gulf, rather
than over the Gulf waters towards the land mass, these winds
20peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake and J. Malcolm
Wagstaff, The Middle East; A Geographical Study (London:
John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.), pp. 20, 26.
11
offer little relief and are of the hot and dry variety. ^^
The most favorable climate during the summer, then, is to be
found in the Kurdish areas.
Iraq is a land where rainfall is generally scarce and
water is a valuable resource. Precipitation in Iraq ranges
from less than 100 mm to more than 1500 mm per annum. The
bulk of this rainfall occurs during the winter months in the
Kurdish region, where precipitation ranges from 400 to 1500
mm per annum. The remainder of the country receives between
100 and 200 mm per annum, a significant difference. Iraq is
unique of the three nations which comprise Kurdistan with
regard to the distribution of precipitation. While Turkey
and Iran receive significant amounts of rainfall in their
Kurdish regions, they also enjoy similar levels in other
areas of their countries. Iraq's precipitation, however, is
concentrated primarily in the Kurdish area.22
Water resources are measured not only by precipitation
but also by evapotranspiration and water surplus figures.
The essence of these figures is that they demonstrate the
potential for water loss through evaporation and
transpiration and measure the degree of water surplus or
deficit for a given area. Again, the most favorable
evapotranspiration figures are found in the Kurdish region,
21w.B. Fisher, The Middle East . Fifth Edition (London;
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1963), pp. 372-373.
2 2 Beaumont, Middle East , p. 65.
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with a low of less than 570 mm ranging to a high of 1140 mm.
Evapotranspiration figures for the remainder of the country
are in excess of the latter figure. ^-^ Surplus figures show
a similar trend. Surplus water supplies in the Kurdish
region are greater than 12 00 mm per annum, while the
remainder of the country shows figures of 100 mm or less.^^
The bulk of Iraq's water resources, then, are situated
in the Kurdish region. However, statistics alone tell only
part of the story. The effective use of water resources in
the agricultural sector depends not only on rainfall
quantity, but also on soil characteristics, such as degree
of productivity and salinity.
Again, the gifts of nature were bestowed most abundantly
in the Kurdish region. The north-eastern portion of Iraq is
composed of predominantly reddish brown and mountain soils,
which are highly productive, especially for cereal crops
such as wheat and barley. The south-eastern portion of the
country possesses alluvial soils, which are extremely rich
and productive but require constant and careful maintenance
due to their marshy characteristics. Rice, as well as
dates, are popular crops in this region. High silt and clay
levels, as well as excessive salinity which must be
mitigated by controlled flooding and draining of the area,
hamper the exploitation of these soils. Additionally, the
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 72-73.
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 80-81.
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region copes infrequently with floods and droughts which
limit productivity in the area.^^
The amount of cultivatable soil in Iraq is a subject for
debate, with governmeAt statistics quoting a figure of some
12 million hectares. Approximately four million hectares of
this potential cropland is in the northern and central
portions of Iraq, and is rain fed land. The remainder, some
eight million hectares, requires irrigation and is in the
south. "Some observers believed that the amount of land
classed as cultivatable was unrealistically high because it
was doubtful that water could be made available to begin
cultivation. The area actually cropped annually has been
about 3 million hectares. ... "^^
B. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ
With the increased emphasis on oil production to obtain
foreign exchange in order to fund the Iran-Iraq war and to
rebuild the infrastructure following that war, agricultural
production in Iraq has suffered. Prior to the discovery of
petroleum, agriculture was the most important sector of the
economy. The decline of an agricultural base in Iraq has
serious internal security ramifications for the nation.
Although productivity has always been low, agriculture has
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 331-3 35.
^^Richard Nyrop, ed, Iraq; A Country Study . Foreign
Area Studies Series, (Washington, D.C.: The American
University, 1979), p. 154.
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historically provided the bulk of employment for Iraqi
citizens. The continued shift of workers from the
countryside to the cities has the potential to cause serious
problems if the economy is unable to absorb the displaced
workers. The decline of agriculture did not happen
overnight, but was a result of overambitious and mismanaged
government policies over a very long term which failed to
consider the ambitions of the population as well as other
economic factors.
For most of this century, farming techniques employed in
Iraq were not much different from those used in biblical
times, resulting in low crop yields relative to land under
cultivation. Soil fertility was maintained, not by
fertilizers, but by leaving the land fallow. A tenant
farming system benefitted the usually absentee landlord
rather than the peasant who worked the field. As a result,
sharecroppers were not motivated to learn new farming
techniques or invest in expensive equipment. ^^
During the 1950s, increasing oil revenues led the
government to establish a comprehensive development policy.
This effort began with the creation of an independent
Development Board to optimize the country's potential and
provide guidance to all economic sectors. Despite its best
efforts, the Board faced an uphill battle and was criticized
^'^Edith and E.F. Penrose, Iraq: International
Relations and National Development . Nations of the Modern
World Series, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), p. 174.
15
for its slow approach to development which emphasized public
projects rather than improving the average person's standard
of living. The Board, responding to the criticism, invited
the British economist Lord Salter to examine development
issues in Iraq and provide advice. Salter recommended that
improving the lot of the largely poor populace be a priority
over grandiose projects, such as dams and roads, and also
suggested that the various ministries provide inputs and
work closely with the independent Board. ^^
During the development years of the 1950s, agriculture
employed some 70 percent of the population, but contributed
only 3 percent of the national income. Development Board
attempts to implement Salter's advice into the agricultural
sector were largely ineffective. The Board had difficulty
getting the money to the peasant who needed it, and funds
allocated to agriculture were often not spent.
Additionally, the government was fearful of inciting the
landlord-sheikhs with land reform initiatives and land
taxes. 2^ Poverty in the rural areas was so severe, and many
of the landlords so unjust, that often the peasant preferred
to take his chances in the newly industrializing cities.
Migration of farmers to urban areas depleted the already
inefficient agricultural sector's labor force. -^'^
^^Penrose, Iraq , pp. 167-172.
^^Penrose, Iraq , p. 177.
2*^Penrose, Iraq , pp. 164-165.
16
The 19 58 coup which brought Kassem to power was quickly
followed by land reform initiatives. The purpose of these
initiatives was not only to benefit the peasant, but also to
strip power from the politically dangerous landlords. The
essential feature of land reform was to distribute the land
to the peasants, who would then pay for the land with long-
term government loans and, as a condition of ownership, join
government cooperatives. However, land reform was not a
panacea. Lands were taken from the sheiks quickly, and
distributed to the peasants slowly. Government management
of the cooperatives, which farmers were reluctant to join,
was often pathetic. To make matters even worse, the country
was in the throes of a serious drought at the time.
"Agricultural production fell and during the 1960s never
really recovered ."31
The 1970s ushered in new land reforms which were aimed
primarily at the Kurdish tribal chiefs. The government
sought first, to break up the chief's large holdings and
second, to initiate a program of collective farming.
Collective farms (the conversion of a cooperative into
a unit worked as a single farm under collective
management) increased rapidly in the early 1970s, from six
in 1972 to 72 in 1974. Growth was much slower thereafter,
and the total stagnated at 79 in. . . 1977 . . . .The area of
collective farms continuously increased, however,
amounting to 180,000 hectares in 1977. In addition state
farms were established....-^^
-^^Nyrop, Iraq , pp. 159, 160.
^^Nyrop, Iraq , p. 161.
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Increasing the area of collective fanning, however, did
not offset the overall decline in total area under
cultivation. In addition, the fanners were not motivated to
work harder, and production suffered as well. Barley
production declined from 954,000 tons in 1957 to 458,000
tons in 1977, and wheat production dropped from 757,000 to
696,000 tons during the same time frame. -^-^ 1982 figures
show a slightly improved yield, at 965 and 902 for wheat and
barley, respectively.-^^
Eighty percent of all cultivation in Iraq is dedicated
to the production of wheat and barley, which "is
concentrated in the northern, wetter parts of the country,
and in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands. ... "^^ It is this land
which is most economical to farm because it suffers least
from the effects of salinization, and would be least
affected by changes in river distribution patterns, as the
land is rain fed.-^^ Also, since the land is located in the
most favorable summer climate area in Iraq, it is prime land
for growing multiple crops per year, rather than limiting
production to single crops in the cooler months.
33Nyrop, Iraq , p. 266.




-^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp 331-333.
^^Marr, Iraq , p. 260.
18
The main drawback to this land, from a government point
of view, was its location in Kurdistan. The Iraqi
government, in an effort to assume control over the area,
established many collective farms in this region after land
reform was initiated.
Already by 197 5 reports were growing that agricultural
conditions were deteriorating. Migration to the cities
continued and labour shortages were reported. .. .Even the
drive towards collective farming seemed to have lost
momentum; only seven new farms were set up between 197 3-74
and 197 5-7 6 and total reported membership had decreased by
1396. Half of the increase in agricultural cooperatives
was... in the autonomous area of Kurdistan, .. .An additional
one-third of the co-operatives were in Nineveh and Kirkuk,
also in the north. Thus, well over half of the new
cooperatives were founded in an area where the local
inhabitants had recently been defeated. ... -^^
By the late 197 0s, according to one estimate, roughly
half of the Iraqi workforce earned their living in the
agricultural sector, but contributed only eight percent to
the nation's GNP.-^^ Another estimate paints an even
gloomier picture, with only 30.2 percent of the workforce
engaged in agriculture in 1977.-^^
The continued migration to the cities has resulted in an
increase in the number of people working in the service
sector, which is now the largest sector of the economy, the
^^Penrose, Iraq , p. 459.
^^Nyrop, Iraq , pp. 262, 118.
•^^Economist Intelligence Unit data extrapolated from
Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978 and cited in Joe Stork,
"Iraq and the War in the Gulf," MERIP Reports . No. 97/June,
1981, p. 14.
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major employer being the state itself. ^^ Services is an
all-encompassing definition which includes many low-paying
and poverty level jobs, such as cigarette selling and street
sweeping. Construc.tion has also siphoned off many
agricultural workers, and now contributes 10.3 percent of
the GDP, slightly more than agriculture.^^
Low productivity has resulted in increased imports of
food products.
In 1958, Iraq imported little food and exported certain
grains. By 1964-1966 it was importing 14 percent of its
agricultural supply; by 1975-1977 the figure had reached
3 3 percent. Between 1974 and 1981, cereal imports had
increased over two and a half times. By 1982, food
constituted 15 percent of all imports. Some of the
increase was due to a growing population, as well as a
rising standard of living. . . .More was due to rural
migration. ^^
Continued decline in the agricultural sector, both in
absolute and relative terms, means that Iraq will become
increasingly reliant upon food imports for her survival.
Should the single resource economy suffer severe
international oil shocks, or if a futuristic concept such as
cold fusion becomes a reality, Iraq could face real hunger
as a consequence of a lack of diversification. Further, the
increased migration to the cities has social effects as
well, fostering a loss of traditional values and methods.
^^Stork, "War in the Gulf," MERIP . No. 97, p. 16
^^Stork, "War in the Gulf," p. 14.
^^Marr, Iraq , pp. 259-260.
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the "marginal man" syndrome, increased disaffection,
alienation and potential for political upheaval. ^-^
Baghdad is well aware of the weakness of the
agricultural sector. Initially tentative government
efforts, begun in the late 1970s, to move away from capital-
intensive collective farming and towards privatizing the
sector quickly gained momentum as a result of the war.
In spite of considerable investment in agriculture on the
state's part, production levels have not greatly improved,
and shortages of labour and other constraints connected
with the war have combined to necessitate fairly large
scale imports of foodstuf f s. . . . At the same time, 80% of
all loans to the agricultural sector in 1981 were to
private firms or individuals, and a form of agricultural
"reprivitisation" has taken place. ... Farmers were no
longer required to belong to or sell through agricultural
cooperatives or state farms, and could now sell direct to
public sector or private wholesale markets. ^^
The success of this policy shift will depend upon the
government's continued commitment to the agricultural
sector, both in terms of privatization and in stemming urban
migration by creating an environment where employment in the
industry is an attractive option.
Success also hinges on the government being able to
reduce the Kurdish threat to stability in the fertile
agricultural areas. This has been accomplished by the
resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds from the
^•^A detailed discussion of this concept is found in
Rafael Patai, The Arab Mind . Revised Edition (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), Ch. XII.
"^"^Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since
1958; From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: KPI , Ltd.),
p. 266.
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border areas of Iran and Turkey to the cities of Arbil and
Sulaymania as well as to settlement centers in western Iraq.
According to Kurdish sources, these are forced relocations
which require that the displaced Kurds abandon their fields
and orchards, leaving them unable to support themselves.
Additionally, they have accused Baghdad of replacing the
resettled Kurds with Egyptian farmers, and, with the Kurdish
threat in the area reduced, investing significant sums (some
$3225 million) in infrastructure development such as roads
and water development projects, as well as housing and
tourism. ^^
C. OIL AND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ
Prior to the discovery of oil, Iraq's economic base
rested upon agriculture. Initially, oil had little impact
upon the economy, as the concession system limited the
profits which accrued to the population.
The development of the oil industry in Iraq can be said
to have undergone four distinct phases. The first phase was
one of minimal government involvement in the industry and
minimal profit accruing to the nation as a result of
development of oil resources. As the level of
industrialization in the country was so low, there was
little domestic need for petroleum products, a general lack
of awareness regarding the importance of petroleum
^^"Carrot and Stick in Iraqi Kurdistan," Middle East
Economic Digest . 11 August 1989, p. 18.
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resources, and consequently no outcry over foreign
interference in the industry.
The first phase of development began when oil
concessions were granted in Iraq in 1925 for a period of 50-
75 years to a consortium which was originally known as the
Turkish Petroleum Company. The consortium, later renamed
the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) , obtained drilling rights
to the entire country.
The consortium partners of the IPC established a
monopoly by squeezing out a multi-national holding company
(Mosul Oilfields, Ltd., or MOF) which was originally a
British concern but later came to include shareholders from
Italy, Germany, Holland, France, Switzerland and Iraq. This
was accomplished by IPC's paying MOF's overdue rent while at
the same time placing IPC members on the MOF board of
directors, obtaining MOF shares and reorganizing the
company. By 1941, the company was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of ICP, thus ICP controlled all oil production in the Mosul
and Kirkuk areas. In return for drilling rights in Mosul,
the Iraqi government required the IPC, unlike their Kirkuk
venture, to construct a specified number of drilling rigs
and pump a specified amount of oil annually, and gave the
company a seven and a half year timetable for production to
begin. Government royalties consisted of 20 percent of the
total oil produced.'*^
46Penrose, Iraq , pp. 137-139
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This imposition of conditions upon the oil companies
ushered in the second phase of development as the government
came to realize the profit potential of the industry. The
government was highly interested in infrastructure
improvements, such as drilling rigs, pipelines and refining
capacity, which would enable increased production and bring
the country greater profits. Baghdad's enthusiasm for
increasing both production and profit was at odds with the
oil companies' desire to carefully control the amount of oil
on the world market in order to avoid a price collapse. It
was inevitable that the situation would come to a head,
ushering in a third phase of development in which the
government mounted a concerted effort to reduce IPC control
over petroleum resources.
In the early 1950 's IPC subsidiary companies (Mosul
Petroleum and Basra Petroleum) developed fields to the west
and south of Kirkuk. Development increased in the 1960 's
when the government took matters into their own hands,
voided 99.5 per cent of the inactive oil concessions and
formed the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) . Government
development of fields, such as the North Rumaila field in
southern Iraq, was accomplished with the help of Soviet
technicians.'^^ A French corporation, Entreprise de
Recherches et d'Activities Petrolieres (ERAP) , was awarded a
development and exploration contract. In 1972, the
"^^Sluglett, Iraq , p. 100.
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government began nationalizing all foreign oil interests,
completing the process by 1975."^^
Nationalization, the fourth phase of development, meant
total government control of the oil industry and was seen in
Iraq as an important step in throwing off the last vestiges
of the imperialist yoke. However, this step, while popular
with the masses, did not result in an immediate rise in the
standard of living, as it occurred during a time which was
marked by a general stagnation in the industry.
The era of stagnation ended shortly after nationaliza-
tion was initiated with the events of the early 1970s. The
Ba ' ath government was able to capitalize on and take credit
for the enormous increases in oil revenues and concurrent
rise in living standards which occurred in the wake of the
1973 Arab-Israeli War, the OPEC oil embargo and the sharp
rise in oil prices. It was at this point that Iraq entered
an era of full and complete control over her vast oil
resources, and thus the responsibility for managing and
preserving them rested entirely in the government's hands.
The Kurds were quick to realize two important points:
one, petroleum revenues accruing to Iraq were substantial,
and two, a significant portion of these revenues were
generated from the Kirkuk oil fields, viewed by Kurdish
"^^Public Affairs Department, Exxon Oil Corp, Middle
East Oil and Gas , Exxon Background Series (New York: Exxon
Corporation, 1984), p. 12.
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nationalists as a part of a proposed autonomous region of
Kurdistan.
Oil... was at the heart of the dispute. .. .They demanded
that the region of Kirkuk, Iraq's richest oil-producing
area, be included in the autonomous province, but the
Baathist leaders rejected the demand. The Kurdish leader
not only claimed that "Kirkuk is Kurdistan," but also
demanded a share of the national budget proportional to
the Kurdish population. The Kurds estimated their
population to number a quarter to a third of Iraq's ten
million people. .
.
(and) demanded about 20 to 25 percent of
the Iraqi national budget.'*^
The late Kurdish nationalist Mullah Mustafa Barzani,
interviewed by The Washington Post in 1973, indicated his
willingness to entrust the management of the Kirkuk fields
to American oil companies. Naturally, Baghdad was less than
delighted with this turn of events, having already taken
steps to change the ethnic composition of the region in
preparation for an "official census" to determine what
portions of Iraq should be designated as the autonomous
region of Kurdistan. Government measures to squelch the
Kirkuk issue included the forcible deportation of Kurdish
families to Iran and remote areas of Iraq, as well as
assassination attempts on Barzani and his son Idris.^^
"^^R.K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf and the Strait of
Hormuz, International Straits of the World Series (Alphen
aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff,
1979)
, pp. 104-105.
^^Peter Sluglett, "The Kurds," Committee Against
Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI)
,





On May 30, 1988, Iraq announced the development of
several new oil fields, including ones at Balad, West Qurna,
East Baghdad, Nasiriya, Saddam, Khabbaz, Safwan and Haji.
According to the Iraqis, these new fields have the potential
to increase Iraq's total production by as much as a million
barrels per day.^-'- While this figure may be optimistic, the
increased production potential may be behind Iraq's
increasingly brutal management of the Kurdish threat. In
August 1988, poison gas was used against Kurdish citizens at
27 locations in the north-west corner of Iraq near the
Syrian and Turkish borders. Baghdad's concern for the
security of the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline (discussed in Chapter
V)
,
as well as a major highway and railway line, are also
possible motives for the attacks, as part of a government
effort to "permanently clear the Kurdish civilian population
from the region surrounding these facilities. "^^
^^Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report; Iraq .
No. 3, 1988, p. 11.
^^The Kurdish Program, Program Update . March 1989,
Cover map, p. 1.
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V. TURKEY
A. OVERVIEW OF GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES: LAND AND WATER
ASSETS
Turkey is a land of 54.2 million persons who inhabit
301,381 square miles^-^ of some of the most potentially
productive agricultural land in the region. The relief
characteristics of this land, particularly in the eastern
regions, have served to impede the exploitation of the
asset. Not only does the altitude make farming difficult in
parts of the nation, it also limits passage through some of
the mountainous terrain, particularly in those areas lacking
rivers which could be used as travel routes.
In Turkey, two major, though not continuous, mountain
belts are usually recognized. The Pontus Mountains are an
interrupted chain of highlands paralleling the Black Sea
coast. They rise in altitude in an easterly direction to
heights of more than 3,000 m south of Rise. Inland from
the southern coast... is the much more formidable range of
the Taurus Mountains. .. .Between the two ranges the central
or Anatolian Plateau lies sandwiched. This is almost
everywhere about 500 m in height and relatively isolated
from the coastal regions.^"*
The area traditionally referred to as Turkish Kurdistan
is bounded by the northern (Pontiac or Pontus) mountain
chain, the Taurus Mountains to the west, and the borders of
Iran, Iraq and Syria to the east and south. This region
^^ PCGLOBE PLUS .
^"^Beaumont, Middle East , p. 17
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covers some 230,000 square kilometers and consists of 18
provinces which encompass nearly one-third of all Turkey. ^^
Turkey is subject to often severe earthquake activity
which results from the movement of geoloqical plates in the
mountainous areas of the region. Turkey's eastern provinces
are located primarily on the Arabian plate, which is moving
upward. The Turkish plate, encompassing central Anatolia,
pushes westward against the Aegean Plate, which is moving in
a southwesterly direction, overthrusting the floor of the
Mediterranean Sea.^^
Turkey's climate, by the standards of the region, is
quite favorable for agricultural pursuits. A warm
"Mediterranean" climate prevails in the western and southern
regions, and along portions of the Black Sea coast. The
central plateau and the eastern regions of the country
experience colder weather with a clearly-defined winter
season. In the latter region, cold winters limit the
growing season to only a few months. ^^
Turkey enjoys a relative abundance of precipitation as a
consequence of her geographic position relative to the
surrounding seas, which are an important source of moisture.
Altitude as well as wind patterns also play a role in the
distribution of rainfall. Throughout the country, mean
^^Chaliand, People Without a Country , p. 47.
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 20-21.
^^ Beaumont, Middle East , p. 75.
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annual precipitation totals range from a low of 2 00 mm in
the central plateau to a high of greater than 1500 mm,
mostly in the coastal regions. In the mountainous area of
eastern Turkey, where a significant portion of the Kurdish
population resides, precipitation averages about
"800 mm/annum, but the sheer size of the area gives it
tremendous importance in the water balance of the region. "^^
Evapotranspiration figures for all of Turkey do not
exceed 1140 mm, with figures of less than 570 mm
predominating in the Kurdish region. ^^ Surplus water
figures vary greatly, from greater than 2400 mm/annum along
parts of the Black Sea coast, and greater than 12 00 mm/annum
along parts of the Mediterranean Sea and the mountainous
areas of the southeast, to less than 100 mm/annum in the
central Anatolian plateau and along the Syrian border. ^^
Both the Tigris and the Euphrates River originate in
Turkey and are fed almost exclusively from water which
originates in the snowpacks of the mountainous areas of the
east, where the bulk of the Kurdish population resides. The
Tigris-Euphrates river system is of critical importance to
agricultural development in the region. The Euphrates River
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 64-66.
^^Beaumont, Middle East , p. 73.
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 82-83.
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provides water to Turkey, Syria and Iraq.^^ Exploitation of
this river in the form of dam projects in eastern Anatolia
have the potential to change not only the overall climate of
eastern Turkey, but also the degree of stream flow in the
latter two nations.
Soil characteristics vary throughout Turkey. Terra
Rossa soils, which are extremely productive, are found in
the western part of the country along with red prairie
soils. The central plateau and the southern region near the
Syrian border consist largely of chestnut, brown and reddish
brown soils, best suited for dry farming. In addition,
sierozem soils are also found. These desert soils are
unproductive in and of themselves, but if carefully managed
and irrigated, can be very productive. In the mountainous
regions of the southeast, forest soils predominate.
However, the steep nature of some parts of the terrain
encourages erosion and has only marginal agricultural
utility, primarily for such activities as grazing. ^2
Terracing of land and increased use of fertilizers could
increase fodder productivity in this area.
^^Marion Clawson, Hans H. Landsberg and Lyle T.
Alexander, The Agricultural Potential of the Middle East
(New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc.), pp. 203-
205.
^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 34-39.
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B. AGRICULTURE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN TURKEY
Turkey is relatively rich in agricultural resources,
obtaining significant revenues from exports of cotton and
tobacco. Additionally^ Turkey produces substantial amounts
of cereals, grapes, olives, figs and tea, and has a virtual
monopoly on hazelnut production. Opium production, once a
problem, is now strictly controlled by the government and
exported for pharmaceutical applications. Fishing and
animal husbandry also contribute to this sector of the
economy. ^-^ "Finally, one cannot resist mentioning a really
off-beat agricultural product: snails. Apparently, French
gourmets have started out-eating the home production and
have turned to Turkey as an important source of
supply. . . . "^^
Agricultural development is Turkey has made fairly
steady progress since the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire.
Traditionally, a large percentage of the population has
engaged in farming, and favorable climate and soil
characteristics throughout the country ensure a comparative
advantage in this sector.
Prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic,
agricultural development was hampered by a lack of
^•^Anwar M. Shabon and Isik U. Zeytinoglu, The
Political. Economic. and Labor Climate in Turkey .




^^William Hale, The Political and Economic Development
of Modern Turkey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 10.
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infrastructure development as well as unsophisticated
farming methods. Initially, most development, both
industrial and agricultural, was concentrated in Western
Anatolia, principally in the areas around Istanbul and
Izmir. This region contained not only the greatest and
wealthiest proportion of the population, but its location
allowed easy export to European markets. ^^ Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk's development goals were focused on expanding road
and railway networks and thereby opening up the central and
eastern portions of Anatolia so that they could contribute
to the development of the economy.
Agricultural development during the 1920 's faltered,
partly due to a drought at the end of the decade and partly
due to the depression, which caused a drop in commodity
prices. Government intervention in the sector during this
timeframe was slow in coming. At the establishment of the
Republic the processing of food and textile manufactures
continued to take precedence over industrial and large-scale
agricultural development. This was due in part to
...the economic and political situation of the 1920's.
War losses had to be made good, and the unity of the state
had to be maintained against dissension and rebellion.
Entrepreneurial skill was scarce after the removal of most
of the Armenians and Greeks, capital was short, while low
customs duties and foreign concessions were maintained by
the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).^^
^^Beaumont, Middle East , p. 430
^^Beaumont, Middle East , p. 431
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There were a few government contributions to agriculture
during this decade, however. A tithe of some 12.5 percent
of annual production was eliminated and a sales tax was
substituted which applied only to products which were
shipped via rail or sea or sold outside the producer's
village. The government was able to make up the difference
from the loss of these revenues by income which was
generated from the government-controlled monopoly
industries, such as tobacco, matches and alcoholic
beverages, as well as by raising import tariffs when the
Lausanne Treaty tariff restrictions expired in 1929. Also,
the Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankasi) was reorganized, its
capital doubled, "and the administrative bodies in the rural
districts. . .became its shareholders."^^
In the 1930 's, agricultural development continued to
take a back seat to industrial expansion. The government
did, however, provide price supports in the wake of
collapsing commodity prices at the start of the decade, a
function which in 1938 was taken over by the "Office of Soil
Products" or TMO (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi) . Additionally,
indirect benefits did accrue to the farmers who produced
crops with industrial applications, such as cotton, hemp and
beets. ^^ During this period, the government's stated
concern for the farmer, on the one hand, and failure to
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , pp. 41, 43.
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , p. 62.
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develop the agricultural sector, on the other, has received
retrospective criticism. However, with commodity prices at
an all-time low,
...there was no incentive for increased production of
Turkey's traditional exports. A widening gap in the
balance of payments could not have been cured by
devaluation, granted the inelasticity of demand for export
items. In these conditions, restriction of imports was
virtually inevitable. Assuming that domestic consumers
were not to be starved of even the most basic manufactured
goods, such as sugar and textiles, then import replacement
industries were necessary to keep them supplied. ^^
Infrastructure development, critical to large-scale
marketing of agricultural output, was minimal in the Kurdish
regions during this timeframe. Revolts broke out in the
area, the most notable of these in Dersim (now Tunceli) in
1937. "Turkish efforts to establish roads and gendarmerie
posts in Kurdish districts soon ran into opposition. . . .A
'state of siege' introduced there in 1936 lasted until 1950
while the area remained closed to foreigners until as late
as 1965. ""^O
In the 1940's, Turkey's price support policies
benefitted the government. The TMO had improved their
storage capacity, and with their monopoly on grain imports
and exports, they were able to make a killing during the war
years when grain prices rose. Despite the rise in prices,
agricultural production during this time actually fell. The
farmer did not directly benefit from the price increases.
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , p. 80.
^^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 18.
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since he "was obliged to sell to the TMO" which "paid prices
which were well below free market levels. ... "^^ During this
decade, the government dabbled in land reform initiatives,
selling off portions of public domain land to Balkan
immigrants and landless peasants, but had less luck breaking
up the holdings of large and mid-sized estate owners,
despite initiation of legislation to facilitate such an
action. The essential feature of the law was that, after
parceling out public domain land, the state would distribute
private holdings of 500 hectares, followed by 200 hectare
holdings, and lastly, that 2 hectare holdings that were
sharecropped would be cut to five hectares. This last
portion of the land reform law proved enormously unpopular,
and was quietly withdrawn at the end of the decade. All in
all, only 3 600 hectares of private estates were transferred
under the provisions of the legislation.^^
Industrial development during the 1940s continued to
receive priority, but fewer than six percent of industries,
mostly handicrafts, were located in the Kurdish regions at
mid-decade. ^-^
During the 1950 's, the Democrat Party, which had gained
power at the start of the decade, expressed a determination
to dedicate more attention to agriculture as well as
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , pp. 62, 63.
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , pp. 63-64.
^^Chaliand, People Without a Country , p. 52.
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industry. During the first three years, superb weather
conditions produced bumper crops and Turkey became an
important wheat exporter. "But in 1954 harvests reverted to
normal, or worse; not until 1958 was there another wheat
surplus. "^^ For the first four years, the economy hummed
along, but by the middle of the decade inflation began to
set in. The government reacted to the growing discontent of
the population by silencing the opposition, imposing
censorship laws and restricting the activities of the
Republican People's Party. ^^
At the start of the decade, the Democrats backed up
their words with deeds: increasing the number of loans to
the agricultural sector and importing tractors to increase
productivity. Eastern development efforts included the
building of roads as well as hospitals and schools. ^^
Additionally, the government nearly doubled its investment
in efforts such as irrigation projects to improve
agricultural development. The sector saw more growth during
the first half of the decade than the last, although some
experts argued that the money could have been better spent
on other production factors such as instruction in
^"^Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1974), p. 142.
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , p. 86.
^^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 18.
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scientific fanning methods, fertilizers, and higher quality
seeds. ^^
To sum up, the Democrat's legacy in Turkish
agriculture was a mixed one. . . .Quite probably, the
government would have done better to have mixed tractors
with other innovations, to produce a higher rate of
production growth, and avoid some of the side effects of
hasty mechanisation. On the other hand, the case
presented by their critics is far from proven. What is
virtually undeniable, moreover, is that a substantial
proportion of the rural population was markedly better off
in 1960 than in 1950, and most villagers were likely to
compare this performance with the virtual stagnation in
agriculture during the last decade of RPP rule. In
political terms, at any rate, the DP's agricultural policy
could hardly be described as a total failure. ^^
By historically emphasizing industry over agriculture,
Turkey had neglected an area in which it had comparative
advantage. In the 1950s, attempting to rectify this
neglect, Turkey applied industrial techniques to
agricultural pursuits rather than utilizing the significant
surplus labor force available in the country. This resulted
in increased unemployment, flight of workers to other
countries and growing urbanization of the population.
Further, the economic problems which resulted from the
Democrats' overambitious development schemes influenced the
decision by the military to take over the government in
1960.
During the 1960 's and 1970 's, the agricultural sector
continued to become less labor intensive and more capital




intensive, and relied less on climatic conditions and more
on industrial factors such as fertilizers and
mechanization.^^ Large scale irrigation projects were a
part of this shift. During this time, the number of
tractors in use increased some eleven-fold, from roughly "40
thousand in 1960 to 441 thousand by 1979. "^0 Although the
eastern provinces continued to lag significantly behind
their western counterparts in modernizing farming
techniques, the number of tractors in the Kurdish region
increased some 46 percent between 1965 and 1967. Despite
this increase, only three percent of the country's total
agricultural machinery was located in the region. ^^
Mechanization accelerated the growing interdependence of
the agricultural and industrial sectors. Not only was the
agricultural sector providing goods for domestic consumption
and continuing to be an important source of foreign exchange
earnings, it also was providing an increasing number of
crops with industrial appl icat ions . ^^ Increased
mechanization of agriculture further aggravated the already
^^Shabon, Turkey , pp. 62-63.
^^The World Bank, Turkey; Industrialization and Trade
Strategy (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1982), pp. 292-
293.
®^Chaliand, People Without a Country , p. 51.
^^Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, "Agrarian
Change: 1923-70," in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet
Tonak, eds., Turkey in Transition; New Perspectives (New
York; Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 284.
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growing tendency towards urban migration, not only in the
developed west, but also in the Kurdish region:
The population of industrial cities tripled and even
quadrupled between 194 and 1970. It is noteworthy that,
in addition to major industrial centers such as Istanbul,
Izmir and Adana, provincial cities with large agrarian
hinterlands (such as Urfa, Diyarbakir and Malatya)
experienced population explosions between 1960 and
1970.23
In the 1970s, state investment in the Kurdish region
continued to place a priority on security-related
infrastructure projects and mining projects rather than
agricultural development. Roads, railways and airports were
constructed or improved to connect the military bases in the
area. In addition, oil was discovered at Raman, Siirt and
Diyarbakir. These fields, while small by middle eastern
standards, were producing four million metric tons by 1971,
most of which were earmarked for domestic use and which
became significant to the economy when oil prices rose in
the early 1970s. ^"^
Turkey is divided into nine agricultural regions. The
principal crops and climatic conditions are listed in Table
1 below.
Despite the wide variety of crops produced and the
diverse climatic conditions of the country, the agricultural
sector in Turkey remains highly specialized. "In 1980, 71%
^^Margulies and Yildizoglu, "Agrarian Change: 1923-
70," pp. 284-285.
84Chaliand, People Without a Country , p. 53.
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Region No. /Name Principal Output





















































^^Adapted from World Bank, Turkey:
and Trade Strategy , pp. 290-91.
Industrialization
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of the cultivated area was devoted to cereals, of which
wheat and barley accounted for 85%."^^
C. ENERGY RESOURCES
Turkey, unlike Iraq and Iran, has a relative paucity of
oil reserves relative to her neighbors.
Petroleum is in fact the one important natural
resource of which Turkey is notably deficient: her known
commercially viable reserves are almost entirely confined
to Siirt province, in southeastern Anatolia and meet only
a small percentage of her present consumption.^^
Turkey's oil imports consume an increasing portion of her
total budget, and have been a cause for the government's
concern. To a considerable extent, Iraq's requirement for a
secure route for their oil output benefitted Turkey. The
two Iraq-Turkey pipelines which run from Kirkuk to
southeastern Turkey and on to the Mediterranean for ultimate
delivery to tankers are an important source of revenue in
the form of transit fees which are frequently paid for in
oil.^^ In an effort to continue this mutually beneficial
relationship, Turkey has proposed that the second pipeline
^^World Bank, Turkey; Industrialization and Trade
Strategy
, p. 286.
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , p. 11.
^^United States General Accounting Office, Energy
Security; An Overview of Changes in the World Oil Market ,
Report to the Congress, August, 1988 (Washington D.C.; U.S.
Government Printing Office), pp. 134-136.
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be enlarged to double the capacity to 1 mn b/d, which would
match the capacity of the first. ®^
Turkey has endeavored to limit her dependence on imports
through development of alternative energy sources. Coal and
lignite are located in abundance throughout the country and
are used to a great extent. However, their polluting
effects have had an adverse impact on the environment and
quality of life, particularly in the cities.
Hydroelectric power is just beginning to be exploited in
the eastern portion of the country. Between 1972 and 1980,
production of hydroelectric power increased more than three-
fold, from 3204 million kilowatt hours to 11,351 million
kwh.^^ Turkish development projects in the southeast,
discussed below, have already resulted in the completion of
two of the 19 hydroelectric dams which are included in the
Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) . Turkey hopes to generate
enough electricity for her own needs and possibly become an
energy exporter as a result of this project. Both Iraq and
Syria, who suffer an uncomfortable dependence upon Euphrates
water, are concerned that Turkey's new construction will
limit the availability of the resource, a possibility that
the Turks have not denied, since no treaties regarding water
rights exist between the nations. To further complicate the
^^Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report; Iraq .
No. 3, 1988, p. 13.




situation, the dam is under construction in the very heart
of Turkish Kurdistan, and Turkish Kurds, rather than
welcoming the contribution to the local economy, fear
further "Turkification" efforts by Ankara. As a
consequence, the Turks are alert to the possibility of
sabotage against the project. ^'
Uranium, critical to development of nuclear power, has
recently been discovered in Izmir province near Bergama in
Saricaoglu. This find is significant in that it is the
first discovery of uranium in sufficient quantity to have
potential for commercial exploitation. ^^ Turkey is planning
on developing nuclear power plants as a major source of
energy in addition to the measures described above. Also,
an active search for additional oil reserves is underway
which Turkey hopes will compensate for shrinking domestic
output. Turkey anticipates that these efforts, combined
with an enthusiastic energy conservation campaign, will
result in a significant reduction in dependence on foreign
energy sources. ^-^
^^FBIS, "DIE WELT Reports on Building of Ataturk Dam,"
WA102100 Bonn DIE WELT in German 28 October 86, p. 3,
(Article by Peter M. Ranke: "Monstrous Machines Roll Day
and Night in the Name of Progress") 12 November 86, pp. T4-
5.
^2"Rich Uranium Seserves in Bergama," Newspot Turkish
Digest . 12 October 1989, pp. 5-6.




Turkey is one of the most important producers of
chromium, producing about six percent of the world output.
Turkish chromium's excellent quality commands double the
price of South African chromium, which is by and large the
price leader of this mineral. Because there is no ready
substitute for this mineral, the demand for it is relatively
inelastic. (This was made apparent by a price variation for
the mineral of only five percent between 1978 and 1984,
despite a reduction in demand during 1982-1983).^^
Turkey also produces bauxite, copper, salt, phosphates
and boron minerals, as well as small quantities of lead.
Tungsten, manganese, wolfram, mercury, and sulphur are also
produced. With the exception of chromite, boron, and
occasionally copper, most of these minerals are devoted to
domestic applications.^^ Table 2 shows the locations of
significant mineral deposits.
E. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk realized the importance of
infrastructure development to the modernization of Turkey.
Since the formation of the Republic, development in the form
of railways and improved roads has been constructed
^^Raymond F. Mikesell, Nonfuel Minerals; Foreign
Dependence and National Security (Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press, 1987), pp. 80, 97, 178-179.
^^Hale, Modern Turkey , pp. 11-13.
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^^Adapted from Hale, Modern Turkey . p.
Chaliand, People Without A Country , p. 102, n. 1.
12, and
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principally in support of industrial applications, and,
until fairly recently, has been concentrated in the western
and central regions of the country where most of the
industrial development had taken place. Today, only three
major roads cross the eastern portion of the country:
...the northern highway, which begins in Ankara and
reaches the Turco-Iranian frontier via Sivas, Erzincan,
Erzurum and Agri; the central highway, which extends as
far as Lake Van via Kayseri, Malatya, and Elazig, and the
southern highway, a prolongation of the coastal
Mediterreanean road, which crosses the High Mesopotamian
Plain and follows the borders of Iraq and Syria. ^^
When compared to the western and central portions of Turkey,
the infrastructure in the east is seriously undeveloped.
The rail network in Turkey is 5127 miles long,
consisting largely of "old and slow" trains. ^^ Like the
roads, the rail lines tend to thin out as they approach the
eastern quarter of the country. Air travel is fairly well
developed, and remains the most efficient method of
traveling across the country, although planes do not fly to
all areas on a daily basis. Busses, though uncomfortable by
western standards, have well-developed routes and are an
efficient means of individual travel.
Infrastructure improvement is critical not only to the
success of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) but also to
^"^Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Eastern Turkey
(Istanbul: Grafik Sanatlar Matbaacilik ve Ambalaj San. A.S.,
1986) , no page numbers.
^^Dana Facaros and Michael Pauls, Turkey (Chester,
Connecticut: The Globe Pequot Press, 1986), p. 7.
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the growth of the region as a whole, for several reasons.
The Turkish government anticipates increased tourism (and
accompanying tourist receipts) as sightseers travel to Mount
Ararat and the historical cities in the area subsequent to
the development and improvement of amenities. Additionally,
high quality hotels and roads are a prerequisite for
investor travel in the area and an effective transportation
system is needed to ensure that produce and other goods are
transported to market quickly and in good condition.
Communications development in the southeast includes the
expansion of television broadcasting capability in the
region. Turkey's two existing television stations were
recently augmented by a third, known as "Channel GAP" which
broadcasts to fourteen cities in the GAP region for three
and a half hours daily. Program fare includes entertainment
and agricultural programs, as well as "health, and tourism
and cultural education shows. "^^
F. SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP) ^^^
The most significant agricultural and industrial
development in Turkey's history will occur in the eastern
portion of the country in the coming decade. Construction
^^"Channel GAP Starts Broadcasting on 2 October,"
Newspot Turkish Digest . 28 September 1989, p. 3.
^•"•^Unless otherwise indicated, information in this
section is adapted from Republic of Turkey, Undersecretariat
for Treasury and Foreign Trade, Buyers Highlights from
Turkey; GAP Special Issue (Ankara: Export Promotion Center,
1988) .
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has already begun on a series of massive hydroelectric,
irrigation and water storage projects in eastern Anatolia.
When completed, the project will encompass one-tenth of the
total land area of Turkey and include 13 sub-projects (seven
on the Euphrates River and six on the Tigris River)
consisting of a total of 15 dams and 18 power stations.
Turkey anticipates that this project will eventually double
the total agricultural output of the nation. -^^-'- Under the
title "Southeast Anatolia Project" or its Turkish acronym,
GAP, this development is centered upon the construction of
the Ataturk Dam. When completed it will be the fifth
largest in the world. The 180 meter tall earthen dam will
consist of eight 300 megawatt turbine assemblies which will
produce sufficient hydroelectric power for eastern Turkey's
needs along with the potential for export of electric power.
The dam and its associated development projects will also
irrigate some 9000 square kilometers of land between the
Tigris, Euphrates, and the Syrian border, where wheat,
grapes, cotton, sugar beets and fruit trees will be grown.
The project has necessitated the evacuation of dozens of
villages, many of them Kurdish, in the Harran plain in order
to flood the reservoir. This giant reservoir is held back
by the Ataturk Dam as well as the Karakaya and Keban Dams.
When it reaches its full size, this huge lake, in addition
^^^Ali Balaban, The Southeastern Anatolian Project
(Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1988), pp. 3, 6.
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to the irrigation projects, has the potential to change the
climatic conditions of the region. ^^^
The Ataturk Dam project, which is "being built by
Turkish contractors, and without foreign financing" ^^-^ is
the flagship of the Lower Euphrates Project. The Lower
Euphrates Project also includes the Sanliurfa tunnels, two
parallel tunnels which will carry water under pressure from
the Ataturk reservoir to Sanliurfa to provide irrigation to
the lower plains of Sanliurfa, Harran, Mardin and
Ceylanpinar. These tunnels will be the largest of their
type in the world, some 26 kilometers long and 7.6 meters in
diameter. ^^^ In addition, a hydroelectric power plant is
scheduled for construction at the Harran main canal, the
outlet of these tunnels. The total area to be irrigated
under this project exceeds 500,000 hectares at a minimum.
In addition, plans are being formulated to develop an
irrigation pumping station in the Siverek-Hilvan area, in
the north of Sanliurfa province. This will be augmented by
a pumping facility to be installed between Bozova and
Hilvan, which will increase the potential area of irrigation
by nearly 230,000 hectares.
102pBjs^ DIE WELT Reports on Building of Ataturk Dam,
12 November 1986, pp. T4-5.
103iipjj ozal: There are No Longer Any Obstacles to
Prevent Turkey's Development," Newspot Turkish Digest . 5
October 1989, p. 7.
^*-*^Balaban, Southeastern Anatolian Project , p. 9.
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The second development project is the Karakaya
Hydroelectric Power Project, which was completed in 1987 and
began operation in late 1988. It consists of a 173 meter
concrete dam which was built 166 kilometers below the Keban
Dam for the sole purpose of hydroelectric power generation.
This project produces some 7 3 54 GWh of power annually.
The third development project is the Border Euphrates
Project. It is a combined hydroelectric power generation
and irrigation project which includes two dams, the Birecik
Dam and the Karkamis Dam which will be located 92 kilometers
below the Ataturk Dam. This project will supply a good
portion of the water for a fourth development project, the
Gaziantep irrigation project, which will irrigate an area of
some 89,000 hectares of plains area along the Syrian border.
This project also includes three dams, one of which
—
Hancagiz—has been completed.
A fifth project to increase irrigation capacity west of
Bozova is the Suruc-Baziki Irrigation Project, which will
irrigate an area of some 146,500 hectares and extend the
irrigated area of the Sanliurfa-Harran project to the Syrian
border.
The proposed Adiyaman-Kahta Project is linked to the
Ataturk Dam project and is designed to increase irrigation,
water storage and hydroelectric power capacity in northern
Adiyaman Province. This project is slated to include five
dams which will irrigate 77,824 hectares of land and provide
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an energy output of 5091 GWh. The seventh project, the
Adiyaman-Goksu-Araban project, will supply irrigation water
to southwestern Adiyaman, northeastern Gaziantep, and a
portion of southeastern Kahramanmaras provinces, as well as
potable water to Gaziantep city.
An eighth project under development is the Dicle
(Tigris) -Kralkizi Project. This is a combined irrigation
and hydroelectric project which consists of two dams,
constructed in series, on the Tigris River. A canal system
from the Tigris Dam will provide irrigation to an area of
some 126,000 hectares.
Two projects in the Batman area are designed to increase
irrigation and hydroelectric potential. The Batman Project,
scheduled for completion in 1992, consists of a 74 meter
rockfill dam which will provide 483 GWh of energy output and
irrigate some 8000 hectares. The Batman-Silvan Project
includes two reservoir dams, the Silvan and Kayser, which
will produce some 964 GWh annually.
The eleventh and twelfth projects have been designed to
improve irrigation and hydroelectric potential in Siirt
Province. The Garzan Project is two-fold: it includes the
Garzan-Kozluk irrigation project to divert water from the
Garzan river for irrigation purposes, and the Ilisu Project,
which entails construction of a dam 50 kilometers south of
Siirt on the Tigris River. The latter project is expected
to provide 38 3 GWh annually.
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The final project, the Cizre Project, is designed for
irrigation and hydroelectric applications. It consists of a
dam, a power plant and two irrigation systems. Total output
of this project will be 89,000 hectares of irrigated land
and 1200 GWh of energy generated annually. In addition, two
separate irrigation systems, the Silopi System and the
Silopi-Nerdus system, will be completed this year and are
included in this overall project. This will increase the
total irrigated area under this project by 34,740 hectares.
These projects have been designed to optimize the
potential of the land and take into consideration other
factors, such as quality of soil, degree of erosion, access
to urban areas and industrial development potential. The
region has been divided into zones which consider these
factors as part of the planning and prioritization process.
These zones are as follows:
ZONE 1: This zone includes the Diyarbakir-Batman area
the Greater Sanliurfa area and the Cizre-Silopi area.
Agro-industrial development will be intensive in this
region and facilitated by the extensive irrigation
projects which are under development in the area. This
zone is characterized by easy access to urban services
and superior land capability.
ZONE 2: This zone includes greater Gaziantep and
Siirt. Because tha land in this area is marginal,
priority will be placed upon industrial development
around Gaziantep and animal husbandry will be
emphasized in the Siirt region. This zone is
characterized by easy access to urban services and low
land capability due to marginal soil characteristics
and erosion.
ZONE 3: This zone encompasses the outlying regions of
zone 1. The goal for this area is to improve
infrastructure, such as roads and railways, for easier
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access to markets. This zone is characterized by poor
access to urban services and superior land capability.
ZONE 4 : This zone encompasses the areas within
Southeast Anatolia which are exogenous to the areas
listed above. Development of this zone will receive
low priority, unless significant mineral deposits or
tourist potential become apparent. This zone is
characterized by poor access to urban services and poor
land capability.
In addition to the above-listed zones, some areas of the GAP
region, such as Adiyaman and the Mardin-Kiziltepe area, have
some of the combined features of the first two zones listed
above
.
In order to develop these zones, Turkey has, in addition
to the projects listed above, concentrated on improving the
chemical industry in the region with a goal towards
increasing production of fertilizers, pesticides and
herbicides as well as plastic wrapping materials for
agricultural business applications. Concurrently, Turkey is
seeking to improve transportation, telecommunications and
take greater control of urban development in the region, to
include planned housing development, sewage treatment
plants, roads and potable water systems, as well as
encouraging the development of hotel industries to support
the anticipated influx of businesspeople and investors to
the region. Finally, Turkey is actively wooing investors
with ready cash and technological capabilities, such as
Japan, to assist in financing these development schemes.
In the past decade, Turkey's attempt to strengthen the
economy by developing agriculture in the east while
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investing in large scale industrial projects has had the
goal of encouraging the eastern portion of the country to
contribute to the nation's economy while improving quality
of life in the region. The government had hoped that this
investment, by improving the economy and unemployment levels
in the area, would reduce the strife in the eastern regions,
feeling that the source of Kurdish discontent was "economic
impoverishment" and "years of neglect" as well as "official
persecution and exploitation. "^'^^ The resumption of fierce
hostilities between Kurdish elements and the government
within the past ten years suggests that the success of the
government plan is by no means certain.
^•-•^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 18.
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VI. IRAN
A. OVERVIEW OF GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES: LAND AND WATER
ASSETS
Iran is a harsh and rugged country with a wide variety
of temperature and climate extremes ranging from the
forested mountains to the north and east to the central and
southern desert plains. Rich in natural resources, its most
significant asset is oil. This nation also enjoys
significant deposits of coal, copper, iron ores, lead, zinc
and other metals and minerals. '^^ Agricultural land,
forestry, and fishing assets are significant by middle
eastern standards. -^^^
Iran encompasses an area of 636,293 square miles and has
a population of 51.9 million inhabitants. '^^ Roughly 54
percent of these individuals inhabit the urban areas. Over
a third of these city dwellers are concentrated in the
capital city of Tehran. The remainder of the population is
logically distributed, with the bulk of the residents
^^^Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran; An Economic Profile
(Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1977), pp. 8-
10.
107rjnj^g Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Profile: Iran 1987-88 (London: The Economist Publications
Limited, 1987), p. 25.
108pcGLOBE PLUS.
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occupying the fertile regions while the desert and
mountainous areas remain sparsely populated. -^^^
Iran is geophysically located on the Iranian and Arabian
plates, which are bisected by the Zagros thrust zone that
runs along the mountain chain. The instability of the area
caused by plate movement produces significant earthquake
activity in the region, most notably along the boundaries of
the plates. 110
Soil characteristics vary throughout the country. In
the central plateau, gray and red desert soils predominate.
These soils, by and large, have a high salt content and are
generally unsuitable for farming. To the north, in the
Caspian lowlands region, very fertile hydromorphic soils are
found. In the southern portion of Iran, alluvial soils are
found around the Shatt al Arab region, as well as reddish
prairie, chestnut and brown soils along the southern coast.
An FAO study, which classified soil potential for
agricultural purposes in Iran, determined that the soils
with the greatest potential and fewest limitations occurred
with greatest frequency in the region bounded by Kermanshah,
Tehran and Tabriz. (The northern border of the country, the
soils around Mashad, and to a lesser extent, the soils
around Ahwaz and Shiraz, were found to be equally productive
lO^EIU, Country Profile: Iran 1987-88 . pp. 10-11
H^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 21, 25.
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as well).^^^ In the Zagros Mountains region, a variety of
soil types are found, ranging from brown steppe soils to
non-saline alluvial soils to the predominating semi-arid
lithosoils. -'^^ These soils support forestry, agriculture
and animal husbandry. Thus, the Kurdish region of the
country is only one of several agriculturally productive
areas.
The climate in Iran varies greatly by season and region.
Extremes of temperatures occur in January (coldest) and July
(hottest). In general, colder temperatures occur in the
north and mountain regions of the country, while the Persian
Gulf coast and the desert regions experience extremes of
heat. In the Kurdish areas, the temperature has a range of
some 2 5 degrees centigrade. January temperatures are at or
near freezing, and the temperature gradually warms until
August, which is the hottest month for the area, though
cooler than the desert and southern regions. ^-^-^
Precipitation varies throughout the country as well. In
the mountainous regions of the west and north, mean annual
precipitation can be greater than 1500 mm, while in parts of
the central and southern portions of the country, less than
100 mm per year can be found. In general, the most
^^^Beaumont, Middle East , pp. 35, 39-40.
^l^vj. B. Fisher, ed. , The Cambridge Historv of Iran.







favorable precipitation totals are found in the same regions
where soil potential is also greatest. -^-^^ The Kurdish areas
receive an average of about 600 mm per annum, greater than
the country's average of 4 00 mm-^-'-^ and sufficient to support
dry-farming or animal husbandry endeavors. Approximately
half of this precipitation occurs during the winter
months. -'-'^
Water surplus figures follow a similar pattern. The
greatest mean annual water surplus figures (in excess of
1200 mm/annum) are found in the northern Caspian lowlands
and in the area to the east and south of Lake Urmia, ^^^
where a substantial portion of Iran's Kurdish population
resides.
Other sources of water for agricultural purposes include
stream discharges. Unlike Iraq and Turkey, Iran lacks major
rivers, and instead must rely upon smaller stream systems to
augment precipitation. Perennial streams are found in the
mountain regions, most notably in the Zagros. In the
central Zagros, where the Kurdish population resides, these
streams flow in a predominantly westerly direction. By and
large, navigation of these stream systems is impractical,
for depending upon the season their waters are either too
^^'^ Beaumont, Middle East , p. 65.
^^^Fisher, Cambridge History , p. 234.
H^Fisher, Cambridge History , pp. 236-237.
H'^Beaumont, Middle East , p. 81.
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strong or insufficient to support watercraft. Additionally,
the sheer canyons and gorges (called tangs) created by these
streams over time makes passage through the Zagros region
difficult in places. ^^^
B. LAND USAGE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN
Of the total land area in Iran, only about 12 percent is
usable for agricultural pursuits. Cereal, fruit, nut and
rice crops predominate. About one-third of all arable land
is irrigated. ^-'-^ In the Kurdish region the percentage of
arable land is greater than the national average,
approximately 2 percent of the total land in the area. Dry
farming, which predominates in Kurdistan, is greatly
affected by the region's variable rainfall levels. Grains,
sub-tropical fruits, tobacco and vegetables are the
predominant crops. '-^'^ While the northern quarter of the
country is, as a whole, the most agriculturally productive,
the Kurdish area is contained in the northwestern portion of
Iran known as the "Azerbaijan breadbasket," which produces
most of the country's wheat and barley. -'2-'-
l^^Fisher, Cambridge History , pp. 268-273.
ll^Fisher, Cambridge History , pp. 566-568.
120pj^s}^gj^^ Cambridge History , p. 573.
l^ljierbert H. Vreeland, ed. , Iran . Country Survey





Much of the remaining area is suitable for grazing,
providing that precipitation is sufficient to ensure growth
of scrub grass to support the herds. Drought can and does
have a devastating effect upon the region's agriculture and
animal husbandry efforts, and with that, a serious effect
upon the region's economy. One estimate noted that, between
the Kurdish and the Baluchi regions, where pastoral ism is an
important sector "on average, during one year in every five
a total of between 800,000 and one million head of sheep and
goats perish in drought conditions. "'^^
Agricultural development in Iran is inexorably linked to
land reform initiatives. It was only when land reform began
to take hold that mechanization was implemented on a large
scale, and production saw significant increases. The first
weak effort at land reform was instigated by the Democratic
Party during the Constitution period (1906-1921) , to no real
effect. 123
Reza Shah, the father of the late deposed Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi, recognized, like his counterpart Ataturk in
Turkey, the importance of the development of the
agricultural sector. However, like Ataturk, his energies
were devoted more towards modernization of the society and
development of industry. During Reza Shah's reign,
infrastructure development, such as road paving, railway
l^Sfisher, Cambridge History , p. 573.
123pisl^ej-^ Cambridge History , p. 689.
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building and establishment of government offices and banks
took priority over agricultural development. The Shah
experimented with new agricultural techniques on his own
land holdings, but did. not pass his acquired knowledge on to
the population at large. He also established a few model
farms and initiated dam construction and irrigation
projects. His focus on industrial development led him to
establish industries which could utilize the native crops of
the region, such as tobacco, sugar beets, and fruits.
However, these efforts were largely limited to the more
populated areas of the country, and those who lived in the
hinterlands (such as the Kurds) saw little change in their
style or standard of living. ^^^^ What few initiatives he
took in the area of land reform were largely a disappoint-
ment. In the early 1930s, Reza Shah secured Majlis approval
to convey Public Domain lands, some of which were in the
Kurdish region, to those who were cultivating it. The
effort was largely unsuccessful, in that first, few lands
were actually transferred, and second, many of those lands
that were transferred ended up being resold to large
landowners when the peasants were unable to keep up with the
^^^Ij,P, Elwell-Sutton, "Reza Shah the Great: Founder
of the Pahlavi Dynasty," in George Lenczowski, ed. , Iran





payments. -^^^ A later land reform effort met with similar
results:
In 1937, Reza Shah introduced the Land Development Act,
which was designed to encourage the optimum use of land on
the part of both landlord and peasant. Unfortunately, the
act remained a dead letter, because its implementation was
entrusted to the landlords. Those landlords who disliked
the act, did nothing; those who attempted improvements met
with opposition from the peasants who saw no point in
increasing production until the sharecropping scheme was
changed. In 1929, the Majles authorized the Ministry of
Justice to examine possibilities of reforming sharecrop-
ping agreements, but no action was taken. ^^^
A different sort of initiative by Reza Shah was to have
a far greater impact than land reform on tribal societies,
including the Kurds. The Kurds in Iran who earn their
living today from animal husbandry are semi-nomadic; moving
from their permanent homes during the summer months in
search of grazing land.-^^^ Formerly, many of these tribes
had no permanent homes except for the tents which they
carried with them. The movement of these tribes made it
difficult for Reza Shah's government to keep track of them,
rendering them a threat to internal security due to the
influence of tribal leaders and a missed opportunity for
government revenues via taxation. Additionally, their
traditional form of life was out of step with the Shah's
efforts at modernization.
^25pishej-^ Cambridge History , p. 691.
'^^Roger M. Savory, "Social Development in Iran during
the Pahlavi Era," in Lenczowski, ed. , Iran Under the
Pahlavis, p. 96.
127p-i^sher, Cambridge History , p. 410.
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The answer... lay in the forcible settlement of the tribes.
But the army and gendarmerie, who were ordered to carry
out this policy, frequently treated the tribesmen harshly
and unjustly, and the land set aside for the tribes was
often unsuitable for cultivation. Tribal chiefs were
taken to Tehran and kept under surveillance as hostages
for the good behavior of their tribes. These policies
left a legacy of bitterness. Although after 1941 the
tribes regained much of their freedom, they never regained
their former power. -^-^^
Reza Shah's abdication in favor of his son in 1941 after
the invasion of Soviet and British troops put agricultural
initiatives in Iran on "hold" until these forces departed
and the Shah regained control of the country. (Infrastruc-
ture development, however, was enhanced by the occupation,
as establishment and maintenance of supply lines was a
priority of the occupying forces.) Initial efforts to
reform the agricultural sector upon the departure of
occupation forces were met with little enthusiasm:
...the Council of Ministers approved a bill which
stipulated that landlords increase the crop-share of
peasants and share-croppers by 15 percent. The bill was
enforced in some areas, but since it was valid for only
one year, it lapsed in the face of the united opposition
of the landlords, who in 1947 constituted a conference to
review the effects of the law and recommended its
discontinuance. .. .The political power of the landlords,
expressed mainly through the Majlis, two thirds of whose
members were landowners, continued to prevail until the
new Land Reform Law was implemented. ... '-^^
During the 1950s, the Shah began the distribution of the
"Crown Domains." These were lands which had been acquired
by the Shah's father under somewhat questionable
^2 8savory, "Social Development in Iran during the
Pahlavi Era," p. 97.
^^^Fisher, Cambridcfe Historv . pp. 689-690.
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circumstances. Many of these lands were sold to the
peasants who worked them, to the Shah's political benefit at
home and abroad. However, his actions failed to convince
other large landowners to follow suit.^^^
The 1960s ushered in the most significant land reform
initiative on the part of the Shah. Prior to the
implementation of land reform initiatives in 1962, roughly
one percent of the population owned approximately 56 percent
of the land under cultivation. In addition, large holdings
(between nine and 13 million acres) were retained by the
government, religious endowments, and the so-called "Crown
Domains. "131
One of the notable features of Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi's rule was an emphasis on planning. The Shah's 1962
"White Revolution" had agricultural planning and reform at
the forefront, in addition to modernization of other
sectors. The broad features of the Shah's agricultural
program entailed the transfer of lands to peasants on a
large scale. Landlords were required to cede lands to the
tenants who worked it, and were compensated for the land in
installments. The value of the land was assessed based on
the taxes that the landlord had previously paid on the
property, resulting in a favorable price for the purchaser.
The landlord was allowed to retain one village, but was
l^^Fisher, Cambridge History , pp. 691-692.
l^^Fisher, Cambridge History , pp. 686-688.
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required to take one of three actions with regard to it: 1)
Sell it to the peasants in the manner described above; 2)
lease it to the peasants; or 3) Divide the land between
themselves and the peasants, receiving compensation from the
peasants for the portion ceded in accordance with the value
of the property. -^-^
2
The Shah's goals for the agricultural sector were
ambitious. His desire to strengthen and modernize
agriculture in Iran were tied to his hopes for a post-oil
economic base which included a vital industrial sector and
self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector. However,
agricultural self-sufficiency can only be realized if those
individuals working the land receive a reasonable
compensation for their efforts. The Shah's attempts at land
reform failed for a variety of rather complex reasons, among
them being that many large landowners were not, in the end,
eliminated and the land was not distributed across the board
to those persons working it. A selective distribution
policy, excessive state intervention and control in an
effort to boost production, and attempts to water down land
reform initiatives by those with vested interests (not the
least of whom were the clergy, who retained significant
holdings as endowments) resulted in the bulk of the
peasantry being pushed aside and not receiving the
^-^^Lenczowski, Middle East , p. 211
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originally intended benefits of the program^-^-^ . The Iranian
fanner found himself no longer a serf to an individual
landlord, but instead a powerless shareholder in a
government-run corporation. The net result was that small
shareholders sold their shares to large shareholders, moved
to the cities and sought jobs in industry -^ -^ "*
.
With the overthrow of the Shah, the new Islamic Republic
formulated four major economic points which were agreed upon
by all factions. These points, which after a decade have
not been met, continue to be the stated basis of the
regime's economic policy. They are:
oil production should be reduced so as to extend the
life of the reserves;
Agriculture should be given priority or at least equal
importance with industrial development;
Industrial development policy should strive to make
Iran self-sufficient rather than dependent on foreign
powers
;
Economic development should lead to more social
equality, social justice, and not to a widening of the
socio-economic gap.-^-^^
The renewed emphasis on agriculture was a hopeful sign
for the farmers, who looked forward to meaningful land
^-^^Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd.,
1979), pp. 121-123.
^^^Robert E. Looney, Economic Origins of the Iranian
Revolution (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1982), pp. 50-
66.
^^
^Middle East Research Institute, University of
Pennsylvania, MERI Report: Iran . (Kent, G.B.: Croom Helm,
Ltd., 1985) p. 38.
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reform initiatives that would provide them with a decent
standard of living. Their hopes were soon dashed. Many
pro-Shah landowners who had retained large holdings fled the
country, and peasants, confiscated the land. "New land
distribution measures were proposed from 1980 on but never
implemented, although some confiscations effected by
peasants were not reversed. "^-^^ In 1982, the Council of
Guardians vetoed "as un-Islamic. . .economic measures that
were deemed to interfere with private property" which
included "a land reform bill, which would have divided still
existing large holdings among poor peasants. ... "-^^^ This
action was interpreted by many as "both an element and a
directional signal in the treatment of peasants" by the
government . •^^® No less than seven land reform bills were
put forward, implemented and later reversed in the four
years following the Shah's overthrow. Clearly, rather than
improving the lot of the peasants, the revolution worsened
the situation, but, since the revolution's base of support
was urban rather than rural, the government could afford to
^^^Nikki R. Keddie, "Islamic Revivalism Past and
Present, with Emphasis on Iran," in Iran Since The
Revolution: Internal Dynamics, Regional Conflict, and the
Superpowers , Barry M. Rosen ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1985), p. 13.
'-^^Keddie, Iran Since the Revolution , p. 13.
^•^^Keddie, Iran Since the Revolution , p. 14.
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ignore the needs of the poverty-stricken fanner, at least
for the short term.-'--^^
Other factors have had a negative effect on agricultural
development in Iran. The ambitious program of irrigation
through the use of deep wells^^^ begun under the Shah has
resulted in a reduction of the water table, rendering the
existing qanat system less effective. A group of revolu-
tionary agricultural volunteers, the Jihad-e Sazandegi
(construction brigade) , have endeavored to provide the
farmers with technical guidance but, lacking it themselves,
have succeeded more in annoying them rather than improving
their lot. The Iran-Iraq war further impeded agricultural
initiative, particularly in the Kurdish regions along the
Iran-Iraq border, as farmers who were caught in the
crossfire of fighting in the area abandoned their fields. -^^-^
Good weather in recent years has mitigated to a small
extent the lack of investment in and attention to the
agricultural sector. Good harvests notwithstanding, the
government's claim that agricultural output has increased by
more than "4 percent a year must be treated with great
^^^The Economist . 6 February 1988, p. 44.
l^OpQj. details of this program, see Amuzegar, Iran: An
Economic Profile , p. 37.
l^^EIU, Country Profile: Iran 1987-88 . pp. 25-26.
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circumspection" given that foodstuffs continue to make up
about a third of the total value of imports. ^^^
C. ENERGY RESOURCES IN IRAN'S KURDISH REGION
Iran's oil reserves are significant, comprising between
almost seven^"*-^ to more than ten percent '-^^ of known world
reserves. However, the bulk of this resource is located
outside the boundaries of the Kurdish region in a series of
fields which run from the southwestern border of Iran down
along the Persian Gulf. The only important field in the
Kurdish region is the Naft-i-Shah field, located in
immediate proximity to the Iraqi border. This field is
connected by two pipelines (one carrying petroleum and the
other carrying natural gas products) to one of Iran's older
refineries, the Kermanshah refinery, which was built in
1935. This refinery processes only a very small percentage
of Iran's total refined output. When built, its capacity
was 2000 barrels per day. In 1972, the facility was
upgraded to produce 20,000 barrels per day.-'-'*^ This
^^^Eju, Iran: Country Report . No. 1, 1988, pp. 13, 16.
l^^Eiu, Country Profile; Iran 1987-88 . p. 31.
''^^Amuzegar, Iran , p. 7.
^"^^Nyrop, ed., Iran , p. 301; Exxon, Middle East Oil and
Gas , pp. 10-11.
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refinery's output provides petroleum for domestic
consumption rather than export.-'-'*^
Gas reserves in Iran are also significant. At 480
trillion cubic feet, they comprise almost two-thirds of the
total reserves in the Middle East.^^^ However, few if any
of these resources are found in the Kurdish areas. The bulk
of natural gas fields are situated between Bandar Bushehr
and Bandar Abbas along the Persian Gulf coast. The Gorgan
and Sara3chs-Kangiran fields are found in the north near the
Soviet border, and the Sarayeh field is located near Qom.
Three small fields are located south of Naft-i-Shah, -''^® but
at least two of them require the broadest interpretation of
the boundaries of "Kurdistan" to be considered as within the
ancestral territory of the Kurds.
Development of hydroelectric, thermal electric and gas
generation plants assumed increased importance in Iran
beginning in the 1960s. However, much of this development
was concentrated near large population centers and
industrial regions. As a result, few projects were
undertaken in the Kurdish areas. Significant hydroelectric
resources in the Kurdish region include the Aras Dam and the
Shahpor-Awal Dam, which produce some 61 megawatts between
l^^Fereidun Fesharaki, Development of the Iranian Oil
Industry; International and Domestic Aspects (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 212.
I'^^Exxon, Middle East Oil and Gas , p. 22.
^'^^Exxon, Middle East Oil and Gas , pp. 10-11.
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them, compared to a total of more than 800 MW produced by
hydroelectric resources throughout the country. Another
significant power source in the area is the Kermanshah Gas
Thermal Electric Plant, one of more than 3 plants of its
type in the country. ^'*^
D. OTHER MINERAL RESOURCES IN IRAN'S KURDISH REGION
Geological surveys of Iran's mineral wealth are by and
large acknowledged to be incomplete. Given the state of the
economy of the Islamic Republic, the uncertain welcome which
foreign geological experts might receive and the expense of
a complete, large scale survey, it is unlikely that a
comprehensive and methodical exploration of Iranian mineral
assets will be undertaken in the near future. Any
discoveries which are made will more likely be the result of
fortuity rather than a systematic attempt to determine the
full extent of the nation's mineral wealth.
The Kurdish region in Iran does not possess a monopoly
of any of the minerals known to exist in the country.
However, the region does contain certain minerals in
quantity. Exploitation of existing minerals is unlikely in
the near future owing to the expense required to establish
mines and transport the minerals to industrial centers where
they would be processed for use. In addition, since these
^^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Iran: A Survev of U.S.
Business Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1977), pp. 106-108.
72
minerals are available in quantity elsewhere in Iran, there
is little motivation to develop the assets in the Kurdish
areas.
Pre-revolution mining laws, promulgated in 1957 and
amended in 1972, may also have served to impede motivation
by private investors to develop mining ventures in Kurdish
regions. These laws sought to ensure government control
over mining ventures by requiring that licenses or permits
be obtained to conduct exploration for certain types of
minerals, to form a mining corporation or to begin mining.
These regulations also required a payment of a percentage of
profits from some mines to the government, and complete
government control over exploitation of certain types of
minerals (such as fuels, iron and copper) deemed to be
national assets. ^^^ These laws no doubt discouraged
investment in regions such as Kurdistan where infrastructure
development was poor and exploitation of resources would
require enormous investment of the sort not often available
from private investors.
Like energy resources, the extent of mineral assets
found in Iran's Kurdish areas will fluctuate depending upon
where the boundaries of the Kurdish region in Iran are
drawn. Using the broadest possible definition of Iranian
Kurdistan, it could be said that lead, copper, and zinc are
currently exploited in the region. Copper is extracted at
^^^Department of Commerce, Iran , p. 202.
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the Mazraeh and Baychebogh mines in Azerbaijan, but these
reserves, at 100,000 tons, constitute less than one percent
of Iran's total copper assets, the bulk of which are found
in Khorasan and Kerman provinces. Lead and zinc reserves of
the Anguran mine, also in Azerbaijan, are somewhat more
significant, at six million tons. Gold deposits are said to
be found in the region as well, however, they have yet to be
exploited. The only gold mine in Iran, the Muteh mine, is
well outside the Kurdish boundaries, to the south of Qom,
and it discontinued operations in 1972. -'^-^
'^'Department of Commerce, Iran , pp. 196-201
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VII. THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAQ. TURKEY
AND IRAN
A. THE KURDS IN IRAQ
The Kurdish nationalist movement has historically been
pressed with the greatest vigor in Iraq. This may well be
as much a function of opportunity due to the frequently
unstable political situation as an expression of nationalist
awakening. Perhaps the best-known of the Kurdish
nationalist leaders was the late General Mullah Mustafa
Barzani, who battled the Iraqi government from the early
1920 's until the 1970 's. In addition, he played a strong
role in the short-lived Iranian Mahabad revolt of 1946.
Upon the collapse of the Kurdish effort in Mahabad, he fled
to the Soviet Union, but returned to Iraq after the 1958
coup which brought Kassem to power. Government promises of
autonomy were later reneged upon when Kassem began to view
the Kurdish cause as a potential threat to his authority.
(This, in and of itself, was ironic as Kassem was said to be
of Kurdish descent himself) . Full-scale revolt began in
1961 and continued for nine long years, with occasional
cease-fires negotiated each time a new government came to
power, or when both sides determined that a "breather" was
in order.
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq, which was
formed in 1946 along the lines of the Iranian KDP, provided
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the organizational support needed to sustain the insurgency
for such a long period of time. The war concluded on 11
March 1970, with the signing of a peace treaty which
promised that:
The Vice-President would be a Kurd;
Kurds would be represented in the army and State
bureaucracy in proportion to their numbers;
Kurdish representatives would be included in the
Revolutionary Command Council;
Police chiefs, judges and governors in the Kurdish
provinces would be ethnic Kurds;
Kurdish would be the official language in Kurdish
areas ; and
...that a Kurdish autonomous region with a legislative
assembly, should be set up within four years. '-^^
Not surprisingly, few of these points were implemented.
Arguments developed almost immediately regarding the
boundaries of the autonomous region, fueled by each side's
interest in the oil-rich area around Kirkuk. KDP-
government relations remained strained, but an attempted
coup in 197 3 led the Ba'ath government to invite the Kurds
to join the government. By this time, the Kurds were
mistrustful of the government since they had reneged so
often on previous agreements. Some Communist party Kurds
joined the government, but others remained allied with the
KDP.
In the meanwhile, the government in 1970 began a program
of "Arabization" of areas rich in natural resources,
including Kirkuk, Mosul and Khanaqin and other areas in Arab
•^^^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 11.
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Iraq where Kurds had settled. •'^^ The government, which had
agreed to appoint Kurdish governors in the Kurdish areas,
refused to appoint one in Kirkuk, where 65% of Iraq's oil
reserves were located. ^^'^ Kurds who worked in the oil
industry around Kirkuk were fired, a policy of military
harassment and repression of Kurds was instituted and
assassination attempts were made against Kurdish leaders,
including two attempts on Barzani himself. A massive exodus
of Kurds to KDP-controlled areas followed. The government
banned the KDP and the sympathetic Iraqi Communist Party
(ICP) , and attempted a rapprochement with minority leaders,
leading the Kurds to believe that the government "was hoping
to divide the Kurdish nationalist movement and thereby
dominate it."-^^^ By August 1974, full-scale fighting had
erupted, with Iraq committing the full strength of the
military to the fray. The Kurds, for their part, were able
to continue fighting because they were receiving financial
and military support from Iran, the United States and Israel
(this support is discussed in greater detail below) . The
Kurds were pushed into the mountains along the Turkish and
'^^Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Kurds; An Unstable
Element in the Gulf (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 168.
Relations between Iraqi Communists and Kurds have varied in
intensity over the years. For details, see footnote 223.
15'^Pelletiere, The Kurds , p. 167.
l^^Sim, Kurdistan , p. 12.
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Iranian borders, and 150,000 civilians fled across the
Iranian border. ^^^
In 1975, the Shah and Saddam Hussein attended an OPEC
conference in Algiers and, in a conference mediated by
President Boumedienne, hammered out an agreement to their
long-standing border dispute. The Shah, in exchange for
Iraqi border concessions which included a drawing of the
Shatt-al-Arab waterway borderline to his liking (at the
thalweg rather than on the Iranian bank) , agreed to cease
his support of Barzani's Kurds. Thus, once the Shah
obtained the strategic advantage that would enable him to
check Soviet designs, the Kurds were abandoned. Withdrawal
of Iranian aid meant the collapse of the Kurdish insurrec-
tion, and Barzani fled to Iran. He later emigrated to the
United States, where, at the age of 76, he died on 1 March,
1979 at the Walter Reed Army Hospital.
The ignominious rout of the Kurds in Iraq led to a split
in the movement,
...each side accusing the other of responsibility for the
defeat. Jallal Talabani, ousted from the KDP leadership
by Barzani in 1964, had settled in Syria, but in the
aftermath of the collapse saw an opportunity to restore
his position. He returned to Kurdistan and. . .announce (d)
the formation of a new resistance movement, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
.
Meanwhile the remainder of Barzani's old KDP had been
reformed under the control of his sons, Idris and Massoud.
Renamed the KDP (Provisional Leadership) the movement
revived guerrilla warfare in 1976. . .provoking an Iraqi
offensive on 17 March 1977. The following year, more
fierce clashes were reported, giving rise to speculation
^^^Sim, Kurdistan, p. 12.
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that the upsurge was partly attributable to heavy-handed
government treatment of the civilian community, and even
to Soviet backing. -^^^
The Iran-Iraq war resulted in an unusual alliance
between the Baathist government and various Kurdish
elements. Jallal Talabani put aside his differences with
Baghdad and permitted Iraqi forces to transit PUK-controlled
areas in order to supply arms to Iranian Kurds. Later, he
formalized his truce with Saddam Hussein and actively fought
with the Iraqis against the Iranians in exchange for that
now-familiar promise of limited autonomy. This
rapprochement seems inconceivable unless one considers the
situation that both Talabani and Hussein were confronted
with at the time. Talabani 's falling-out with the Barzani
Kurds, who were fighting on the side of Iran, was serious,
and his hatred for them overrode nationalist feelings.
Also, Talabani, if he could gain even limited autonomy,
would be viewed as a hero by his people. If the Baathists
reneged, he would still have his weapons and would be able
to renew the struggle. Hussein, on the other hand, was in
desperate straits in 1983, and was unable to fight a two-
front war. As a consequence, he had no choice but to make
the offer to Talabani in order to avoid defeat. ^^^
^^^Sim, Kurdistan, pp. 15-16.
l^Spelletiere, The Kurds , pp. 185-187
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By 1984, Talabani realized that the concessions he
sought were not likely to be forthcoming. Recognizing that
Baghdad was unwilling to permit meaningful Kurdish
participation in the government, Talabani and the PUK
pragmatically allied themselves with Iran for the remainder
of the war.-*-^^
Shortly after the cease-fire was declared, Saddam
Hussein moved quickly to eliminate the Kurdish threat to his
regime. His systematic use of chemical weapons against the
Kurds was described by Senator Pell of Rhode Island as "a
crime against humanity" and "genocide. "-^^^ The swiftness of
the effort was remarkable: the cease-fire was declared on
2 August, and Iraqi troops were busily mopping up a
successful operation against the Kurds by 10 September.
Some 60,000 Kurds fled into Turkey before the Iraqi military
sealed the border, many with "'blistering, sores on hands,
faces and feet' that were consistent with chemical related
injuries. "1^1 Subsequently "the systematic leveling of
Kurdish Iraq" began and entire villages were bulldozed. The
Iraqi rationale for this action was that they were "taking
families from isolated 'uncivilized' hovels and installing
^^^'Isam al-Khafaji, "Iraq's Seventh Year: Saddam's
Quart d'Heure?" Middle East Report . March-April 1988, p.
37.
^^^Julie Johnson, "U.S. Adamant in Charge Against
Iraq," New York Times . 10 September 1988, p. A4
.
^^^Clyde Haberman, "Questions Linger as Iraqi Push on
Kurds Ebbs," New York Times . 11 September 1988, pp. 1, 23.
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them in new complexes with electricity, schools and running
water. "-^^^ These villages, "such as Khobata, located
between Arbil and Mosul" have been likened to American
Indian reservations. '^^
Iraq indicated that attacks against the local Kurdish
population were retribution for Kurdish aid to the Iranian
Pasaradan. The location of the attacks tells another story.
Most of the villages that were gassed were located in a
Kurdish area far from the Iranian border and not known for
rebel activity. However, what is significant about this
area is that includes a vital oil pipeline, a major highway
and railway line, and is in a location where a second oil
pipeline is under construction and a natural gas pipeline is
planned. Thus the "deliberate depopulation" of the region
would appear to be more for economic and internal security
reasons rather than for retribution and the stated uplifting
of families living in uncivilized conditions. ^^^
162Q2yde Haberman, "Kurds Can't Go Home Again, Because
the Homes Are Gone," New York Times , 18 September 1981, p.
1.
^^•^Robert Ghobad Darius, "The Iranian Revolution of
1978-79: Potential Implications for Major Countries in the
Area," Enver M. Koury and Charles G. MacDonald, eds..
Revolution in Iran; A Reappraisal (Hyattsville, Maryland:




^^"^The Kurdish Program, Program Update (Newsletter) ,
March 1989, pp. 1-4.
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B. THE KURDS IN TURKEY
The vast majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey
has historically resided in the eastern and southeastern
portions of that country. The formation of the Turkish
Republic under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk spawned three Kurdish
revolts in fairly short succession: in 1925, 1930 and 1937.
The first revolt, led by Shaikh Sa'id, a tribal chief who
also was the religious leader of a Nakashbandi Dervish sect,
expressed the concern of the Kurds over the secularization
of the government and assumed the dimensions of a Jihad.
The Kurds felt that religion was the one factor which united
them with the Turkish majority. In addition, they were
angry at government attempts to strip power from the tribal
leaders in the east, and were upset by the poor economic
conditions which prevailed in the Kurdish areas. This
rebellion was fairly violent, and many joined the fray for
monetary rather than religious gain. The Kurdish concern
regarding the absence of religion from government was one
shared by large numbers of the Turkish majority, so the
government attempted to modify public support by arguing
that there were other reasons for Kurdish resistance. They
suggested that the Kurds wanted to form a separate state
with Iraqi Kurds and hinted that they were backed by the
British, with whom the Turks were arguing over the fate of
the Mosul Vilayet. The Kurdish resistance was vastly
outgunned and outmanned by government forces, and the revolt
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was put down. Several of the leaders, including Shaikh
Sa'id, were hanged, while others were imprisoned. The
government cited the revolt as a reason to crack down on the
Kurds, and the harsh treatment that they received influenced
the tribal chiefs in the Mosul area to choose Iraq over
Turkey in the referendum. -^^^
It was during the second revolt that nationalist
aspirations came to the fore. The son of Shaikh Said,
Salah-ed-Din, had escaped to Iraq where he came in contact
with a budding Kurdish nationalist organization which was
made up of others like him who had fled Turkey. When Turkey
declared an amnesty for the Kurds who had fought in the 1925
revolt, he returned to Turkey and formed a political group
called the "Association of the Friends of the Kurds"
whereupon he was arrested, tried and imprisoned. In June
193 0, Kurds from both sides of the Turkish-Iranian border
attacked army posts on the Zilan Plain. After two months of
fighting they were pushed back by the Turks and many fled
across the Iranian border and others to the heights of Mount
Ararat. The Turks lodged a protest with the Iranians,
demanding that they cease allowing the Kurds to attack from
the Iranian side of the border. The Iranians, anxious to
maintain good relations with the Turks, sent a detachment of
troops who pushed the Kurds into the mountains from the
opposite direction, where they dug in. Turkish military
l^^Arfa, The Kurds , pp. 34-38.
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aircraft conducted bombing raids against them, inflicting
many civilian casualties. While the Kurds were trapped in
the mountains, Kurds in Syria were mustering support for
their brothers fighting in Turkey. The Syrian Kurds sent a
detachment of 200 men, which was quickly repulsed. Kurds in
Iraq also attempted to aid the cause, but they too were
routed. Although the revolt was put down, it was
significant in that this was the first time that Kurds were
seen to act out of clearly nationalist, rather than personal
or tribal, interests. ^^^
The third revolt occurred in 1937 in the Dersim area.
The Turks had established a series of police outposts in the
area, which were attacked by local tribes who were able to
push the police out of the district, whereupon they assumed
control. Syrian Kurds, in the meanwhile, had attempted to
enter Turkey to incite revolt amongst the Kurds in the
southern regions, but they were pushed back. In August of
that year, two Kurdish leaders sent a communique to Baghdad
imploring the foreign powers to investigate the situation in
Dersim, alleging that the Turks used poison gas against
them. The Kurds took refuge in the mountains through the
winter and banked on other tribes coming to their aid for a
spring offensive. This much-needed help did not arrive, and
in the spring the Turks pushed them up into the mountains,
captured them, and either executed or imprisoned them. Some
l^^Arfa, The Kurds , pp. 38-43.
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50,000 Kurds who participated in the revolt, and who were
not killed or put in prison, were dispersed to other
vilayets by the government. ^^^
The result of these revolts was that Turkey came to
realize the necessity of eliminating what had the potential
to become a serious internal problem within the country.
The survival and prosperity of the country required either
neutralization of the Kurdish threat, or the loss of a
substantial portion of the nation. An attempt to accomplish
this was made through a process which has been termed
"Turkification . " Essentially, the main feature of
Turkification lies in the idea that Kurds are not Kurds at
all; rather, they are "mountain Turks" who because of their
isolation, have forgotten their mother tongue. Accompanying
this notion, the government promulgated laws which
prohibited the wearing of the Kurdish national dress and any
written or spoken form of the Kurdish language. (This
language ban was eventually written into the Turkish
constitution in 1982).^^^
The government took steps to change the names of the
Kurdish towns to Turkish-sounding names. However, the 1961
constitution which granted increased freedom of speech,
press and civil liberties, permitted the coverage of Kurdish
1^'^Arfa, The Kurds , pp. 43-44.
^^^Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey,"
Middle East Journal . Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, pp.
39839-9.
85
activity in Iraq. These events were followed closely by the
Kurds in Turkey, which caused the government continued
concern. Indeed, up until the inid-1960's, portions of
eastern Turkey were designated "off limits" to foreign
travel in an effort to control the Kurdish population.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Kurds in Turkey began to
affiliate themselves with various Turkish leftist movements,
and because Kurdish parties were illegal, were overrepre-
sented in these organizations. The Turkish Worker's Party
(TWP) was the first of these to acknowledge the existence of
a Kurdish race and criticize government repression of the
Kurds. The first legal Kurdish organization, the
Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East, or DDKO, was
founded in 1969. The military government later dissolved
the TWP, imprisoning its leadership, and banned the DDKO.-'-^^
In the late 1960s, the Turkish military, in an effort to
neutralize Kurdish anti-government activities, initiated
counterinsurgency operations in the east, which increased in
intensity after the 1971 military takeover. However,
military action has not, even to this day, succeeded in
suppressing the Kurdish movement, which has instead grown
and become more, rather than less, of a threat. This could
well be due to other factors, such as the increasing
urbanization and politicization of the once rural, tribal
and nomadic Kurds. Many of these individuals are unemployed
l^^Gunter, "Kurdish Problem," pp. 392-393.
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or working only occasionally, generally in the agricultural
sector, and living in "shantytowns" on the outskirts of the
cities. '^^ The nationalist movement is attractive to these
disaffected individuals who are on the outskirts of society
as well.
There are several Kurdish political movements that are
active either in Turkey or based in other countries which
span a wide range of political orientation. The Socialist
Party of Turkish Kurdistan (SPTK) was suppressed by the
government in 1979, and its leader, Kemal Burkay, is
currently in exile in Sweden. Its platform was moderate in
orientation, taking the position that Kurds and Turks can
live in peace either in a federation with equal rights for
all or by creation of a separate Kurdish state. A Kurdish
Democratic Party of Turkey, formed in 1965 along the lines
of Barzani's KDP in Iraq, split into several smaller groups
a few years after it was formed, many of them Marxist in
orientation. These included the Revolutionary Democrats,
the Kurdish Vanguard Workers Party or "Peshang" (Vanguard)
,
the National Liberation of Kurdistan, and others. None of
these groups however, has received the publicity or
noteriety of the Kurdish Worker's Party, or PKK. The PKK
(who often call themselves the "followers of Apo" or
"Apocus," after the nickname of their leader Abdullah
Ocalan) takes a much more radical approach. The PKK has
I'^^Chaliand, People Without a Country , p. 89.
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been behind most of the ant i-government violence in Turkey
in the last decade or more. In 1980, They formulated an
alliance with ASALA, the Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia, and have been alleged to have engaged
in the manufacture and sale of heroin in order to trade that
drug for weapons. ^^-'
Masoud Barzani, who inherited the leadership of the
Iraqi KDP from his father, the late Mullah Mustafa Barzani,
has taken exception to the violent tactics of the PKK in a
recent interview with a Turkish newspaper. He indicated
that the PKK is mistaken if they believe that they are the
sole representatives of the Kurds in Turkey. ^^^
According to another report, many villagers live in fear
of the PKK. The so-called "village guards"—individuals who
are hired and armed by the government to protect a village
—
recently have been threatened by PKK forces, who have
ordered them to surrender their weapons or be killed. As a
result, at least one village has evacuated their homes in
fear of their lives in favor of living in tents in the city
of Van. The reporter of this story noted that the
government security forces in the region tend not to
discriminate between terrorist and villager, and the often
harsh reaction of these forces benefits the PKK by creating
I'^lcunter, "Kurdish Problem," pp. 394-395.
^^^Mihrisah Safa, "Iraki Kurtlere, Siyasi Multeci
Muamelesi Yapin," Hurrivet . 12 August 1989, p. 18.
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a climate of fear. The reporter pointed out that it is the
villagers who need protection, and that the army is unsure
of who the enemy is.^^-^
Another recent development in the Kurdish issue in
Turkey is centered around the many refugees who fled the
chemical warfare attacks by the Iraqi army. Perhaps due to
an uncomfortable reliance on Iraqi oil, Turkish doctors were
reluctant to state that the cause of the burns was chemical
warfare, and cited that their condition could be attributed
to "poor nutrition and health habits. "-^^^ At the same time,
the Turkish government transferred, against their will, some
2000 Iraqi Kurds to Iran.^'^^
Iraqi KDP leader Masoud Barzani, on one hand, expressed
his appreciation to Turkey for accepting the Kurds who have
fled Iraq, but he also criticized the Turkish government for
failing to regard the Pesh Mergas as political refugees. In
Barzani 's view, these Pesh Merga refugees are entitled to
the same financial compensation that Bulgarian Turks are
^^^Ismet Solak and Atila Korkmaz, "Koylude Apo
Korkusu," Hurrivet . 10 August 1989, p. 19.
^'^'^Clyde Haberman, "Kurd's Symptoms: Gas or Poor
Diet?," New York Times . 12 September 1988, p. Al.
l^^Alan Cowell, "Turkey Moves Out 2,000 Iraqi Kurds:
Transfer to Iran Puts Fate of Other Refugees in Doubt," New
York Times . 8 September 1988, p. Al.
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receiving from the Turkish government. He also stated that
the Turks must accept that there is a Kurdish people. ^^^
Recently, there is a trend towards more open reporting
on the Kurdish issue in the Turkish press. The Barzani
interview is one example of this trend. In addition, an
opposition leader and former prime minister, Bulent Ecevit,
discussed the Kurdish question in detail in a recent
interview in Hurriyet . a daily newspaper. He advocated
several changes in the manner in which the Turkish
government deals with the Kurdish population, to include:
Social and economic development of the southeast;
Urging the government to separate and distinguish
between Kurdish citizens and terrorists;
Policing the interior with civilian forces (gendarmes)
,
who are responsible to the Department of the Interior,
rather than with army forces, who should be used to
protect the borders
;
Withdrawal of Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution,
which are alienating the European community;
Release of all prisoners of conscience;
Modification of the image of "Kurdish origin" citizens
by the Turkish government;
Allowing Kurdish-origin citizens to speak their
language and practice their culture freely; and
Land reform in the southeast, which will give priority
to local residents rather than Bulgarian Turkish
refugees. -'^^
3.
^"^^Safa, "Iraki Kurtlere" Hurrivet . 12 August 1989, p.
^^^Nurcan Akad, "Ecevit, sivil guvenlik gucu onerdi
'Askeri, Dogu'dan cekelim'," Hurriyet . 9 August 1989, p. 19.
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This trend towards greater openness in discussions of
the Kurdish question indicates not only a growing concern
over the nationalist aspirations of the Kurdish community,
but also an increasing sensitivity to the opinions of the
European community on the part of the Turkish government.
This sensitivity is motivated in part by Turkey's quest for
full membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) , of
which Turkey is now an associate member. EEC members, such
as West Germany, Sweden and France have had a long-standing
interest in the Kurdish question. The French, for example,
recently accepted some 337 Pesh Merga as political refugees
and were visited in their military camp by Mrs. Daneille
Mitterand, wife of French President Francois Mitterand. -^^^
Mrs. Mitterand, who is active in French human rights causes
and who leads a world human rights organization called
Frances Libertes, recently addressed the Human Rights Caucus
of the U.S. Congress, "making an impassioned appeal... to
help save the Kurdish people from annihilation. "^^^ Many
PKK exiles, in particular, have formed an extensive and
highly effective network across Europe and are especially
l^^Fatih Gullapoglu, "Pesmerge ikiyuz lulugu, "
Hurrivet . 10 August 1989, p. 3.
^'^^"Capital Line; People Watch," USA Today . 25 October
1989, p. 4A.
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active in Sweden and Germany, churning out nationalist
publications in several languages. ^^^
C. THE KURDS IN IRAN
The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran has varied in
intensity throughout the century, with long periods of
dormancy punctuated by occasional, energetic outbursts.
Generally speaking, the Kurds might be said to serve as a
barometer with which to judge the strength of the
government. When the government is strong, the Kurds are
silent. When the government is weak or disorganized, the
Kurds seize the opportunity to press their demands for
greater control over their own affairs.
The Kurdish Revolt of 1880 in the Azerbaijan region of
Iran is regarded by many Kurds as the first modern-day
Kurdish nationalist uprising, but in fact it was more the
result of regional and inter-power rivalries. Obaidullah
was a Kurdish sheikh who invaded northern Iran with the idea
of creating a Kurdish Muslim state and annexing it to
Turkey. His provocation, ostensibly, was an attack by
Persian troops into the Kurdish area of Turkey which
resulted in the killing and kidnapping of several Kurds.
Some analysts feel that the Shaikh's actions were instigated
by the Ottoman Sultan, who wanted to counter Russian efforts
l^^Martin van Bruinessen, "Between Guerilla War and
Political Murder: The Worker's Party of Kurdistan," Middle
East Report . July-August 1988, p. 41.
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to foment discontent among the Armenians by encouraging them
to agitate for a Christian enclave. In exchange for the
Russians abandoning their efforts in Armenia, the Sultan,
Abdul Hamid, called off the Kurdish revolt. Still others
feel that a combined effort by the English and the Russians
persuaded the Sultan to rein Obaidullah in.-^^-^
In the early 1900s, a Kurdish tribal shaikh, Ismail Aqa,
known as Simko, came to prominence. As a result of the
slaughter of the Armenians of World War I, roughly 25,000
Jelus, or Christian Assyrians, fearing the same fate, had
fled Turkey and settled in an area west of Lake Rezayeh
(Urmia) in Iran. This huge influx of people created
economic pressures, and the region was unable to support
them, as they had no money of their own. The Assyrian
religious leader. Mar Shamun, arranged a meeting with the
powerful Simko to discuss the possibility of the
establishment of an Assyrian-Kurdish autonomous region. At
this meeting Simko shot Mar Shamun in the back, and this
action touched off the massive slaughter of local Azeris,
who had nothing to do with the murder, by angry Assyrians in
retribution. This effectively neutralized the Azeris in
Simko 's efforts at a power grab. The Assyrians, who were
persuaded by the British Dunsterforce to fight against the
Turks, met with a series of hapless circumstances and
miscommunications which rendered their help largely
ISlpeiietiere, The Kurds , pp. 50-51.
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ineffective. In the end, they were neutralized as
competition by the Turks on one hand and the Kurds on the
other. This left Simko free to pursue his designs on the
region. Greed, rather than nationalism, appeared to be his
motivation, and given the lack of effective government
control over the northern regions of Iran, he was able to
range unchecked until 1922, when the Iranian Army was
finally able to put him down. He was pardoned by Reza Shah
in 1924, to whom he swore undying loyalty, but in 1926 he
allied himself with two other tribes and attempted to take
the area again. He was at last put down and captured and
escorted to the Turkish border, where the Turks put him
under house arrest. He was finally released, and tried to
foment insurrection again but did not meet with any success,
and was killed a short while later. -^^^
There was scant evidence of Kurdish discontent in Iran
after this incident, with the exception of a small revolt in
Kurdistan province which was quickly put down, and a brief
unpleasantness in Baneh during the Second World War, until
1946. 1946 was the year of the now legendary Kurdish
Republic in Mahabad. The opportunity for revolt occurred as
a result of the post-World War II environment in the area.
The Russians, who had occupied northern Iran, and the
British, who had occupied southern Iran during the war to
protect the oil reserves from the Germans, had agreed to
lQ2p^^fQ^ The Kurds , pp. 48-62.
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leave their respective areas six months after the cessation
of hostilities. The Russians, however, were reluctant to
leave without an oil concession. As a result of the Russian
presence to the north, the Iranian military was unable to
move in that direction to counter Kurdish activity without
appearing to be provocative, and thus provide the Russians
with an excuse to use force in the area. Qazi Mohamed, a
Sunni Kurdish religious leader, became the first and only
president of the short-lived republic. Assistance was
provided by the Barzanis from Iraq, but it was the Soviets,
who, by their presence in the region, enabled the revolt to
occur. The Soviets were engaged in active agitation of the
population in the northern portion of Iran, although there
is some disagreement over whether the Soviets sought out the
Kurds or the Kurds sought out the Soviets prior to the
events that led to the establishment of the republic. The
Soviets finally departed Iran when the Iranian government
inferred that they would receive the oil concession that
they sought, subject to a vote of the Majlis. The Soviet
mistake was in assuming that this would be a rubber-stamp
vote, and that their concession was assured. Instead, the
Majlis, no doubt with the happy complicity of the
government, rejected the Soviet request. However, this
charade got the Iranians "off the hook" with the Soviets, by
attributing the denial of the concession to the vicissitudes
of democracy. In January of 1947, with the Soviets well
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away from northern Iran, the Iranian army took Mahabad and
hanged the leaders of the revolt. Mullah Mustafa Barzani,
who later achieved prominence in Iraq, escaped to the Soviet
Union by zig-zagging through Iran, Iraq and Turkey with 442
of his fellows, where he stayed for 11 years before
returning to his native land.-^^-^
Kurdish activity subsided in Iran after this affair.
With the exception of the leaders of the revolt, retribution
was not exacted on the Kurdish community. The local aghas
resumed their preeminent positions in exchange for the
maintenance of local discipline, and although infrastructure
improvements in Kurdish areas were rare, so too was severe
harassment of the Kurdish population by the government.
By the late 1970s, the Kurds in Iran with nationalist
aspirations were led by two main factions.
In the northern part of Iranian Kurdish territory, a
coalition of tribes was led by Sheikh Essadin Husseini,
based at Mahabad. He was traditional and feudal in
outlook and the tribal leaders supporting him were
unwilling to surrender their power to modern revolutionary
intellectuals. In the southern part, dominance had been
gained by the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) , led
by Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, a left-wing revolutionary. . .
.
There was also an influential political group, the Komula,
consisting mainly, but not entirely, of left-wing
politically active Kurds, which was much smaller. -^^^
The 1979 Revolution which brought Khomeini to power
provided yet another opportunity for the Kurds to press
their nationalist aspirations at a time when government
IS^Arfa, The Kurds , pp. 70-102.
184oiBallance, Gulf War , p. 132.
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forces were in disarray. While several sources detail the
initial support that the Kurds provided to Khomeini, this
writer heard contradictory reports from individuals who had
come from Kurdistan during the mass evacuation of Americans
after the fall of the Shah. They indicated that bands of
Kurds had violently attacked pro-Khomeini demonstrations.
At any rate, the friendly feelings, if they ever existed,
did not last long.
Three weeks after Khomeini took power, Kurds seized the
army barracks at Mahabad, the site of the Kurds' tragic,
lost republic. .. .The Mahabad incident was merely a warm-
up, and on March 20, 1979, the Kurds in Sanandaj , the
capital of the Iranian province of Kurdistan, followed
their compatriots' example. Because. . .the Shia religious
leader in charge. . .had refused to give the Kurds arms,
they surrounded the barracks and seized the headquarters
of the Revolutionary Guards and the radio station, killing
an indeterminate number. ... -^^^
The situation worsened when the Khomeini regime attempted to
prevent Kurdish wheat farmers from engaging in profiteering
when the price of wheat more than doubled in the wake of the
revolution. This, more than political concerns, "touched
off the revolt. Cheated, as they believed, of their chance
to make a killing, the Kurds went for their weapons. "^^^
The Kurds boycotted the voting for the new constitution, as
they had boycotted the referendum on the Islamic Republic.
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou turned down a position in Khomeini's
government and accused the ruler of "trying to take Iran
ISSpeiietiere, The Kurds , pp. 178-179
IS^Pelletiere, The Kurds , p. 180.
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back to the Middle Ages." The government turned to Iraqi
Army-style warfare against the Kurds, using jet aircraft,
helicopters and machine guns. The Kurds suffered reverses,
but rallied and retook Sananda j , and declared the
establishment of an "autonomous republic. "^^^ The situation
was at an impasse until Iraq invaded Iran, and the Iranian
Kurds threw their lot in with Iraq. "By 1981, the Iraq-
Kurdish cooperation had grown sufficiently serious for
Tehran to offer recognition to all 'ethnic rebels' who
surrendered their arms, an offer directed mainly at the
Kurds. There was no response from Kurdistan. "-^^^ By 1983,
both Iran and Iraq were busily supporting Kurdish factions
in an effort to undermine their opposition. The Iranian
government attempted to mitigate the Kurdish factor by
initiating a major offensive against Iranian Pesh Mergas,
who were driven into the mountains. By 1984, Iran's
relationship with the Iraqi KDP was showing signs of strain,
and the Kurdish element in the war was diminished in
importance. Ghassemlou fled to Iraq, and Husseini
preferred, in the interests of survival against a possible
Iranian-Turkish cooperative military offensive, to maintain
a low profile. By 1986, the Iraqi KDP-Iran alliance had
mended to the extent that Barzani's forces were able to
assist Iran in the taking of an Iraqi garrison at Sitak in
l^'^Pelletiere, The Kurds , pp. 180-183.
l^^Pelletiere, The Kurds , p. 184.
98
March, and contribute to the seizing of Mangesh, located in
close proximity to the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and the Oil
Road.lS^
In the wake of the war, the Iranian Kurds have been
quiet. The 1989 assassination of KDP leader Ghassemlou in
Vienna has significantly rended the movement and reduced its
effectiveness. If a charismatic successor emerges, is
likely that he will wait for the most opportune moment,
which— if the Kurds remain true to form, will occur when the
government is at its weakest—to reinitiate a Kurdish
rebellion in Iran.
189o'Ballance, The Gulf War , pp. 132-212
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VIII. U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE KURIDSH ISSUE
United States' interests in the Kurdish issue are
largely unrelated to the nationalist aspirations of the
Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Rather, the Kurds and their
quest for autonomy are peripheral to the United States'
relationships with those nations which possess a significant
Kurdish population. These relationships often have an
important political, military and economic dimension. To a
considerable degree, United States' interests have also
seirved as a counterpoint to Soviet interests in the area.
American interests are not static, but change over time with
changes in the relationships between the United States and
the governments of the nations involved.
Similarly, Soviet interests have little to do with the
nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, rhetoric notwithstand-
ing. Soviet involvement with the Kurds has been, by and
large, related to pursuit of border security and protection
and enhancement of Soviet assets.
In the wake of the Second World War, the United States'
primary concern in the Middle East was containment of the
communist threat. This effort took the form of military and
financial aid to friendly nations to counter Soviet
influences. At this time, the dissatisfied and politically
unsophisticated Kurds were easily subject to Soviet
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influences, as they recognized that the relationships
between their host governments and the United States were
based on matters of mutual interest.
The Soviets were no strangers to dealing with a wide
variety of ethnic groups with nationalist aspirations,
having achieved, from their point of view, considerable
success around their own periphery. One of their most
dramatic and open attempts at obtaining influence along the
northern tier occurred in Iran immediately after the war.
The establishment of so-called "republics" in Azerbaijan and
Mahabad could never have occurred without a Soviet presence
in northern Iran.
The Mahabad Republic, discussed in detail above, was the
first large-scale though short-lived Kurdish success, and
has since served as a rallying point in history for Kurdish
nationalists. Indeed, the grave of Qazi Mohammed, the
leader of the failed revolt, is revered as a shrine by many
Kurds. 1^0
The United States had no role in the quelling of this
revolt, but its very occurrence strengthened the Shah's
appeal to the United Nations for relief from Soviet
interference. Soviet agitation of the population in
Azerbaijan in 1945 had largely escaped the notice of the
west. What brought Soviet designs into focus was the USSR's
'^^William O. Douglas, Strange Lands and Friendly
People (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 64.
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failure to withdraw from Iran six months after the cessation
of hostilities in accordance with the provisions of the
Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Largely ignored by the west,
which was focusing its attentions on rebuilding Europe, Iran
was left to "buy her freedom by alienating her northern oil
resources to Russia, by permitting Communist infiltration
into her government, and by leaving unsolved the Azerbaijan
issue. . . . "191
The wonder is that the Soviets left Iran at all. They,
of course, had hopes of bringing both a "Republic of
Azerbaijan" headed by an Azeri communist named Ja'far
Pishevari and a "Republic of Kurdistan" into their sphere of
influence, but Kurdish leader Qazi Mohammed had other goals
in mind.
The idea of the Soviets was... to speed up the secession of
Azerbaijan from Iran and its union with the Azerbaijan
S.S.R., and they did not want the Kurdistan state under
its bourgeois and tribal leaders to become independent
and, instead of forming the nucleus of a communist Kurdish
state, to be attracted towards a Western type of
democracy. l^^
To prevent such an occurrence, the Soviets arranged a
meeting in Tabriz between Qazi Mohammed and the Azerbaijan
leaders in an effort to iron out differences. They came to
an agreement which included military, cultural and economic
cooperation; that any negotiations with the Iranian
government would be either joint or with notification of
l^^Lenczowski, Middle East , pp. 182, 183.
192;^i-fa, The Kurds , p. 86.
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each party; and agreed that the majority in each area would
run the respective governments. However, they did not
discuss where the boundaries of the two republics would lie.
Qazi Mohammed was determined to create a much larger
"Kurdistan" than the Republic of Mahabad. His rather
grandiose aims envisioned an independent Kurdistan which
stretched from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and
included incorporation of the Kurdish areas of western
Azerbaijan. The Kurdish tribal leaders who supported Qazi
Mohammed's Komula were also distinctly unenthusiastic about
communist domination, and possessed a historical enmity
towards the Azeris. Further, since the area controlled by
the Komula was located entirely within the Azerbaijan
boundaries, the fight to take the southern Kurdish regions
no doubt lost some appeal after the nationalist warriors
discovered that the area was heavily reinforced and that
Kurds in Kurdistan province were cooperating with the
Iranian government . -^^-^ The departure of the Soviets no
doubt emboldened the Iranian army, while the Kurdish tribal
leaders who declined to participate in the battles had most
likely concluded that Iranian concessions, if granted in
Azerbaijan, would be more advantageous to Pishevari's
communist-Azeris in the long run. No doubt these tribal
chiefs saw clearly that it was "most unlikely that the
Soviet Union sought an independent Kurdish state, but rather
l^^Arfa, The Kurds , pp. 82-98.
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to detach it from Iran and integrate it fully into Soviet
Azerbaijan. "1^4
The Soviet involvement in the ill-fated Kurdish republic
was, at best, half-hearted. Their primary goal was
incorporation of Iranian Azerbaijan, and, despite promises
of financial aid, their support to the Kurds consisted of a
printing press, some arms and ammunition, and some military
band instruments. ^^^ Later, Stalin himself indicated that
one reason for interfering in northern Iran was the Soviets'
concern for the security of their Baku oil fields, which due
to their proximity to the Iranian border, they regarded as
highly vulnerable to sabotage. Additionally, Stalin felt
that the Soviet Union deserved a share of Iranian oil
concessions and was being thwarted by the west.^^^
Iran, having pushed back the Soviet menace with hard
work and clever maneuvering, viewed the 1947 Truman Doctrine
as the answer to its prayers. Concrete assistance from the
U.S. to Iran was immediately forthcoming. "On October 6,
1947, the two countries concluded an agreement extending the
life of the American advisory military mission to the
Iranian army" and followed this up with grants of military
^^'^Sim, Kurdistan, p. 21.
l^^Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt. 1961-1970
(Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973), pp. 50, 55.
^^^Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 212-213,
n. 43.
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hardware, economic planning advice and some $10 million
worth of aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.
Although the Iranians felt that the aid was not nearly
enough, it proved to be the first step in a long and close
relationship with the United States^^^ which culminated in
arms deliveries totalling more than $2.5 billion in the last
year of the Shah's reign. -'^^
The fall of the Shah produced renewed, if half-hearted,
interest in the Kurdish issue on the part of the Soviet
Union.
During 1979, Moscow tried to work out an alliance with
the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP) ... .However,
Kurdish politics in general were fragmented, including
within the KDP. While the Soviet overtures found some
response, the dominant faction of the KDP was not
interested because it remained at odds with the Tehran
government over Kurdish autonomy at a time when Moscow's
higher priority was good relations with Tehran. ^^^
Turkey, of course, was one of the primary beneficiaries
of the Truman Doctrine's largess. During the postwar era,
the Kurds in Turkey were not a factor in relations between
that country and outside powers. Three prewar Kurdish
revolts in swift succession, which protested principally the
'^^Lenczowski, Middle East , p. 187.
l^^Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for
Strategic Stability; Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in
the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance
(Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), p. 895.
^^^Muriel Atkin, "The Islamic Republic and the
Superpowers," in Nikki R. Keddi and Eric Hooglund, eds., The
Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 198.
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secularization policies of Ataturk and the increasing
influence of the new government over what had once been
almost exclusively Kurdish domain, had been forcefully and
decisively put down by Turkish forces. To ensure that the
Kurdish nationalist movement remained dormant, the Turkish
government deported Kurdish dissident leaders to other areas
of the country. ^^^ Since the bulk of the quieted Kurdish
population remained in the underdeveloped, non-industrial
region of eastern Anatolia, they ceased to be an issue in
the immediate postwar years.
America's relationship with Turkey continued to grow
closer over the years. With the exception of the Cyprus
crisis, the two countries have by and large enjoyed a
mutuality of interests. U.S. and NATO bases in Turkey
facilitate security interests in the region and enable the
United States to keep a watchful eye on the Soviets.
American security assistance to Turkey assists that nation
in maintaining the second largest military force in NATO.
As a result, the U.S. has little inclination or desire to
confront Turkey regarding human rights abuses against the
Kurdish population—unlike the members of the European
Economic Community, who continue to pressure Turkey on this
score.
Turkey, for their part, is convinced that foreign
agitators are behind the current troubles in their eastern
200Sim, Kurdistan , p. 4.
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regions. They cite testimony by PKK defendants on trial for
terrorist activities, who stated they were trained in
guerrilla camps in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Additionally,
the Soviet Union has had a long, if tenuous, relationship
with Kurdish rebels in Turkey
—
providing financial aid as
long ago as the 1920s—as well as in Iran and Iraq. The
USSR established two radio stations, in 1958 and 1968,
respectively, which transmitted programming designed to
foster discontent among the Turkish population as a whole,
and the Kurds in particular. ^^^
More recently, relations between Turkey and the Soviet
Union are showing signs of improvement, beginning with the
opening of a border crossing in November 1989 between the
two nations at the border town of Sarp near the eastern
Black sea. This border crossing will be the gateway for
imports and exports between the two countries. Turkey plans
to export products such as agricultural items, textiles, and
construction goods, and receive in return leather goods,
lumber and oil from the USSR. This commodity exchange
program will coincide with the opening of a Turkish
consulate in Baku and a Soviet consulate in Trabzon.
Additionally, Turkish construction companies have agreed to
undertake four construction projects in the USSR, and are in
the process of negotiating a contract for 24 additional
20lGunter, "Kurdish Problem," pp. 400-403
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projects. 2^2 The gradually improving relationship between
the two nations may well cause the USSR to pursue a more
cautious attitude towards involvement in Kurdish affairs in
Turkey
.
During the latter part of World War II, Iraq contended
with a two-year Kurdish uprising which the government was
able to put down. In the postwar years, Iraq, like Turkey,
was spared any major Kurdish uprisings, mainly because the
principal leader of the Kurds, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, was a
guest of the Soviet Union after he escaped following the
collapse of the ill-fated Mahabad Republic in Iran.
(Because of his association with the USSR, Barzani became
known for a time as the "Red Mullah"—a moniker that stuck,
despite the fact that he was neither a communist, though he
willingly treated with anyone who would help him achieve his
nationalist goals, nor a Mullah—Mullah, in fact, was his
first name)
.
Soviet efforts to influence the Kurds in Iraq from afar
continued, although "Soviet radio propaganda and subversive
pamphlets in the Kurdish language failed to stimulate the
Kurds, who had little in common with the Russians, into
insurrection. "203
2 02iirji^j-jrgy^ Soviets to Launch Border Trade," Newspot
Turkish Digest . 28 September 1989, p. 5.
203oiBallance, Kurdish Revolt , p. 57.
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The year 1955 was an important one in terms of American
relations with Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The Baghdad Pact came
into being that year, providing a collective security
arrangement which augmented the United States' containment
policy in the region. Although the U.S. was not a signatory
to the pact, aid to the three countries reflected America's
satisfaction with the arrangement which it had engineered.
This happy arrangement came crashing down with the 19 58
overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq by Abdul Karim Kassem.
From a Kurdish point of view, the most significant aspect of
that revolution was that it enabled Barzani and his
followers to return from exile in the Soviet Union.
Barzani 's return was the opening chapter in a revival of the
Kurdish nationalist struggle in Iraq, a struggle in which
both the United States and the Soviet Union became involved.
The events which led to U.S. involvement in the Kurdish
struggle in Iraq are discussed in detail above. The United
States was plainly unhappy with Iraq for a variety of
reasons; not the least of which was Iraq's hostility towards
Israel, support of radical movements in the region, and
close relationship with the Soviets, all of which were seen
as a threat to U.S. interests in the area.
Rather than drawing closer to the USSR, Iraq was
actually seeking to pursue a more independent tack. By
banning the ICP and also refusing a Soviet request to
provide support to the Palestinians against Jordan, Iraq was
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placing self-interest and preservation of the Ba'th
government at the forefront. The Soviet Union attempted to
bring Iraq back into the fold by concluding a friendship
treaty in 1972 and delivering some $1.7 billion in arms,
including plenty of spare parts which mitigated resupply
problems, over a four year period. Iraq used this enormous
military assistance to pull even further away from the
Soviets and at the same time, to crush the Kurdish
rebellion. The Iraqi military build-up no doubt influenced
the Shah to conclude that the time was opportune to
negotiate the 1975 Algiers Accord. ^^^
While the Iraqis were using their new weapons against
the Kurds, the Kurds were receiving aid which came from a
variety of sources, including the United States, Israel, and
the Shah of Iran. Each contributor was pursuing his own
agenda. The Shah's reasons for providing support to the
Kurds did not include sympathy for their nationalist
aspirations. The Shah, as the self-proclaimed "Guardian of
the Gulf" and an ardent ant i-communist, had strong concerns
about the rise of Soviet influence in the area. The
decision to provide aid to the Kurds was formulated in 1972
by the Shah and then-President Nixon:
The shah proposed to President Nixon that with a little
prodding it should be possible to incite the Kurds over
the Kirkuk issue. It is not known what arguments he used
although one would assume that he emphasized the
2 04cQj^(jgsj^aj^^ The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability , pp. 889-890.
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conclusion of the (Iraqi) friendship treaty with Moscow,
the Baathists' plan to legalize the Iraqi Communist party
and take it into a government coalition, and the fact that
reportedly, the Iraqis were going to grant the Russians
port facilities at Basrah. These points probably provided
arguments enough. ^^^^
Two additional points may have provided important
impetus to the decision, at least as regards the timing of
the decision to aid the Kurds: first, the sharp rise in the
price of oil during the early 1970 's and second, Iraq's
decision to nationalize the oil fields.
After rejecting Kurdish requests for aid in August 1971
and March 197 2, the U.S. agreed to cooperate two weeks
after the IPC nationalization. In addition, Barzani
promised that if he won he was "ready to become the fifty-
first state." He also promised, if successful, to turn
over the oil fields to the U.S., and that the U.S. could
look to a friend in OPEC once oil-rich Kurdistan achieved
independence .2 06
Regardless of which circumstances or arguments proved
more compelling, the end result of this meeting was that the
United States became involved outright in the Kurdish issue.
"Nixon went over the heads of his top intelligence advisors,
overrode the objections of the CIA, and outflanked the State
Department207 ^q order operations supporting the Kurds. "^08
205Pelletiere, The Kurds , p. 167.
^O^Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), p. 140.
^O^^^ccording to the Village Voice . 11 February 1976,
the State Department, which had objected to Kurdish aid in
the past, may well have been initially unaware of the grant
to the Kurds. "The Pike Report reveals 'highly unusual
security precautions and the circumvention of the 40
Committee by the President and Dr. Kissinger that details of
the project would otherwise leak—a result which by all
accounts would have mightily displeased our ally. It is
111
The Shah provided the bulk of the assistance, compared
to a token amount of U.S. aid (some $16 million worth),
mostly in the form of small arms and ammunition. Some of
these arms were obtained via Israel, and were Chinese and
Soviet weapons which had been captured during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war. Other weapons were bought from Cambodia. The
origin of manufacture of these weapons was supposed to make
the Iraqis believe that the Kurds were being supplied by the
Russians rather than the west.^^^ No doubt a secondary
function was to enable the Kurds to put to good use any
compatible Iraqi ammunition that happened to fall into their
hands.
It is unlikely that the Iraqis were convinced that the
Kurds were being aided to any significant degree by the
Soviets, if the assertion is true that, during the Iraqi
army's 1974 offensive, some of the MIG-23 aircraft used to
attack the Kurds in their mountain strongholds were piloted
by Soviet military personnel. Additionally, neighboring
Iran was said to have become actively involved in the
Kurdish-Iraqi battles by 1975, with Iranian army tanks
actually firing shells across the Iran-Iraq borders and some
also clear that the secrecy was motivated by a desire that
the Department of State, which had constantly opposed such
ventures in the region, be kept in the dark'." Quoted in
Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , p. 139.
208peiietiere, The Kurds , p. 167.
209Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , p. 14 0.
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Iranian army units taking the fight across the border into
Iraq. 210
America's main role throughout this time, revealed in
the 1976 Pike Report, was apparently to guarantee the Shah's
continued support as the conflict heated up. In a 13
September 1976 interview with Edmund Ghareeb, Mullah Mustafa
Barzani stated, "We wanted American guarantees. We never
trusted the Shah. Without American promises we wouldn't
have acted the way we did."211
Al-Ahaad , a Beirut newspaper, indicated that American
aid to the Kurds began well before the 1972 meeting between
President Nixon and the Shah of Iran. The newspaper
reported on 10 August 1969 that two American CENTO officers,
a General Hunter and an officer of unknown rank named
Perkins, met with Barzani at his headquarters that same
month on at least two occasions. According to this account,
Barzani signed a secret agreement which netted him $14
million in financial and military aid, with a promise of
more if he were effective in overthrowing the Baath regime.
In exchange for this financial support, Barzani allegedly
agreed to certain conditions. These conditions included
absolute secrecy regarding the deal, excluding even senior
personnel in Barzani 's organization; a promise not to
interfere in any way with Iran, either against the Shah's
210sim, Kurdistan , p. 12.
^l^Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , p. 140
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government or in support of Iranian Kurds; rejection of
Soviet aid, 2-^2 denial of membership in the Kurdish movement
to communists and severance of any links with the Soviet
Union; and that the United States agreed to back the Kurdish
autonomy effort provided it did not go beyond autonomy, and
that Barzani be the sole arbitrator for the Kurds in
negotiations with the United States. Further, the United
States reserved a certain degree of control over the Kurdish
insurgency, cautioning Barzani against initiating "any act
contravening United States directives." When asked about
the validity of the report nine years after its publication,
an unnamed high level State Department official indicated
"that no such agreement had been reached between Barzani and
the U.S. government. "2-'- -^
American involvement in the Kurdish autonomy effort was,
in the end, an effort to obtain the following objectives:
Ensure that Iraq was kept busy fighting the Kurds, so
that they would not turn the full force of their newly
acquired military might on America's ally, Israel.
Limiting Iraq's role in Arab-Israeli conflicts ensured
that Iraq would not have a significant role, either as
a spoiler or by imposing unacceptable conditions, in
any future peace negotiations.
- Reduce the likelihood that Iraq would threaten Iran, or
engage in agitation of anti-Shah forces, or encourage
^^^According to one source, the Kurds in Iraq "were
being supported by the USSR" in the eaiily 1970 's, suggesting
that either this account was inaccurate or the Kurds did not
abide by the secret agreement. See Cordesman, The Gulf and
the Search for Strategic Stability , p. 890.
^^^Ghareeh, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , pp. 138-139,
210, n. 22-24.
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secessionist aspirations among the Arab population in
southern Iran.
By sapping Iraq's energy, the Kurdish revolt ensured
that Iraq would have reduced motivation and resources
which could otherwise be devoted to radical movements
in the smaller Arab states. ^'-^
- Iraq's preoccupation with the Kurds enabled the Shah to
consolidate his position as "Guardian of the Gulf" free
from the concern that his position of authority might
be challenged by Iraq.
The Pike Report "indicated that the Shah, Nixon and
Kissinger hoped that 'our client (Barzani) would not
prevail '... .This policy was not imparted to our clients, who
were encouraged to continue f ighting. "^•'-^ Clearly, a
Kurdish victory would have an uncomfortable impact first,
upon the Shah himself, and secondly on Turkey, both of whom
were staunch American friends. ^ 16 jj^ order to control the
pace of the fighting,
. . .the Iranians had imposed tight controls to prevent
Kurdish partisans building up ammunition stockpiles which
might have given them more freedom to manoeuvre. Pesh
Mergas even recounted stories of lugging ammunition crates
over the mountains only to find, on opening them, that
they were full of dirt. To prevent stockpiling, the
Iranians even insisted on seeing empty shells before
supplying new ones.^-'-^
For the short-term, the United States achieved the
desired objectives in the handling of the Kurdish issue.
Iraq was kept occupied by the Kurdish insurgency for several
^^'^Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , pp. 140-142.
^^^Ghareeh, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , p. 140.
^l^Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq , p. 141.
^I'^sim, Kurdistan , p. 15.
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years to the satisfaction of our important regional allies,




The regional interests of the three nations with
significant Kurdish populations are not limited to neighbors
who also have Kurdish populations, but also involve
neighbors with interests relating to resources and
ideological issues. The following examines the
relationships of these three nations with each other and
with other regional neighbors in the context of these issues
which confront their security and economic well-being.
A. IRAN AND IRAQ
In looking at Iran's relationship with Iraq, it is
interesting to note that, historical animosity notwithstand-
ing, cordial relations have occasionally existed in the past
between the two neighbors with significant Kurdish
populations along a shared border. Iranian-Iraqi
adversarial relations, however, have frequently involved
intrigues in which the Kurds played a pivotal, if pawn-like
role.
The Shah's decision to "incite the Kurds over the Kirkuk
issue"^-^^ with American and Israeli help exploited the
Kurdish dissatisfaction with the distribution of Iraq's
strategic oil resources. The Iraqi government's decision to
218peiietiere, The Kurds , p. 167
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exclude oil rich Kirkuk from a Kurdish autonomous region was
a sore point, and the financing provided via the Shah
enabled the Kurds to press for a more equitable arrangement.
Friendlier relations with Iraq were sealed with the
signing of the Algiers Accord, which resolved the long-
standing Shatt-al-Arab dispute and resulted in the
withdrawal of U.S. -Iranian-Israeli aid from Barzani's forces
fighting in Iraq. This withdrawal resulted in the collapse
of the Kurdish resistance in Iraq. Clearly, the Shah
preserved the upper hand in this exchange, obtaining the
strategic advantage that he sought in return for calling off
what essentially amounted to a proxy war by the Kurds
against the Iraqi government. ^-^^ Additionally, although
Baghdad's Kurdish campaign was quickly becoming unacceptably
expensive, Iraq had begun to make some headway using
sophisticated Soviet-supplied arms. "For Iran the benefit
of supporting the Kurds as a counter to the hostile Baathist
regime was not regarded as worth the price of an ultimate
confrontation with Iraq. From the Kurdish perspective, the
Iranians had treacherously sold them out."^^^
^'-^As the conflict heated up, it became more than a
proxy war. Fighting between Iranian and Iraqi troops
occurred along their mutual border, and according to Iraq,
Iranians firing U.S. -made Hawk missiles shot down two Iraqi
fighters who were conducting operations against the Kurds
near the Iranian border. See Ramazani, Persian Gulf , p.
105.
2 2 0i^aj,^3 2ani, Persian Gulf , p. 108.
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The 1979 collapse of the Shah's government led Iraq to
reconsider the equitability of the agreement. They
concluded that the agreement was unfair, negotiated during a
weak moment. This, combined with a fear of Khomeini-incited
Shiite Fundamentalist expansionism, as well as a feeling on
the part of Baghdad that they could prevail quickly, led
Iraq to attack Iran.
Iran's enemy status began anew with the Iran-Iraq war.
The Kurds, as noted previously, were quickly made a factor
in the war effort by both sides. The Khomeini regime's
support of Kurdish elements in Iraq forced Saddam Hussein to
come to terms briefly with Jalal Talabani, trading Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) logistical assistance for limited
autonomy concessions. Iran, not to be outdone, paid Idris
and Masoud Barzani's Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) to
fight against the Iranian KDP, which was supported by Iraq,
and later, to fight against Iraqi forces directly. Later,
Talabani came to his senses, traveled to Tehran, and placed
himself at Khomeini's disposal . ^^-^ However, in the final
analysis, while the Kurds played a role in the war, their
2 2 '-Edgar O'Ballance describes the various Kurdish
alliances as follows: "The chaotic Kurdish situation was
that the Iranian KDPI (fighting against Khomeini) was being
supported by Baghdad; the Iraqi PUK (fighting against
Baghdad) was fighting alongside the KDPI; while the Barzani-
KDP (supported by Teheran) was fighting against the KDPI and
the PUK. The outbreak of the Gulf War... simply reinforced
these cross-alliances." The Gulf War (London: Brassey's
Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 133.
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tendency to switch sides without warning made them more of
an annoyance than a decisive factor.
Kurds were conscripted into the Armed Forces of both
combatants. Although both had a large deserter problem,
there was some compensation, as many of the Kurds who
fought in the war became infected with nationalism. To
both Iran and Iraq, their Northern Sector was a sort of
"Balkan side-show," producing more problems than
solutions. Neither felt that the outcome of the war would
be resolved in that area, which to both was an
inconvenient minor sore.^^^
Khomeini also tried to establish religious organizations
amongst the Iraqi Kurds, but these were not well received.
Additionally, Tehran funded a "Kurdish Muslim Army" in Iraq
headed by one Abbas Shabak, once affiliated with Talabani.
For a time the army was permitted by the PUK to operate, but
after a few years Talabani 's forces infiltrated the group,
captured their weapons and dispersed their personnel . ^^-^
Saddam Hussein no doubt greeted the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini with joy and a very large sigh of relief. The late
Ayatollah 's appeal to Shi'ites was based to a large extent
upon his unique and compelling charisma, as well as his
message. No successor with the same magnetic drawing power
has yet come to the fore, and Baghdad is no doubt hopeful
that Khomeini's passing will be followed by a significant
reduction in the fervor of his movement.
222O'Ballance, Gulf War , p. 213.
223Martin van Bruinessen, "The Kurds Between Iran and
Iraq," MERIP, No. 141, July-August 1986, pp. 23-24.
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B. IRAN AND TURKEY
Recent relations between the governments of Iraq and
Turkey have been marked by cooperative efforts to contain
the Kurds and eliminate the potential threat that they pose
to the internal security of the region.
Turkey considers the Kurdish movements of Iraq and
Iran as threats to its own security in several ways. In
the 1960s and 1970s, the guerrilla struggle in Iraq and
later in Iran strongly affected the national awareness of
the Kurds of Turkey as well. Groups in Turkish Kurdistan
organized support for the Kurdish parties in Iraq and
Iran.... The Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK) even
established military bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, under the
protective umbrella of the KDP.^^^
Turkish-Iraqi mutual concerns regarding the Kurdish
threat led to the creation of what might be likened to a
"hot pursuit" agreement between the two nations, which
allows their respective armies to cross each other's borders
to flush out Kurdish insurgents. The agreement was tested
in 1983, when the Turkish military conducted largely
unsuccessful cross-border raids, with the Iraqi government's
blessings, against PKK bases in Iraq.^^^ While the Turks
arrested few of their own subversives, they were able to
round up significant numbers of PUK personnel, many of whom
were delivered to Baghdad and imprisoned or executed.
According to PUK leader Jalal Talabani, the number of
executions had exceeded 1400 by 1983. In September of 1983,
a PUK splinter group captured and held as hostages two
224van Bruinessen, "The Kurds," MERIP . No. 141, p. 26.
225^31^ Bruinessen, MERIP . No. 141, pp. 24-26.
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Turkish pilots who had crashed in Iraq, but fear of
threatened Turkish military reprisal led to their swift
release. 2^^ Despite PUK efforts to avoid future
confrontation with Turkish military forces, other actions
followed:
In August 1986, the Turkish air force coordinated air
raids with an Iraqi army attack on areas in northern Iraq
that were held by the Iraqi KDP, causing many casualties
(165 dead, according to radio Baghdad) . Most or all
victims were, however, Iraqi Kurds, not PKK fighters. On
March 4, 1987 the Turkish air force again bombed alleged
PKK camps in northern Iraq.^^^
Additionally, the two nations cooperated during the
Iran-Iraq war to minimize the disruption of oil supplies.
Iraqi oil was transported by truck and pipeline through
Turkey during the Iran-Iraq war. This Mediterranean outlet
became especially important when Syria shut down the
pipeline running through their nation.
The Iraq-Turkey Lines are two pipelines running from the
Kirkuk region and having a combined capacity of 1.5 mmbd.
Current volumes through the lines are slightly less, at
around 1.3 mmbd. Exports via the Mediterranean enabled Iraq
to continue to obtain revenue despite being cut off from the
Gulf in the course of the Iran-Iraq war.^^®
226oiBallance, Gulf War , p. 137.
^^^Martin van Bruinessen, "Between Guerilla War and
Political Murder: The Worker's Party of Kurdistan," Middle
East Report . No. 153, July-August 1988, p. 46.
228uj-j-i^ted States General Accounting Office, Enercrv
Security: An Overview of Changes in the World Oil Market ,
Report to the Congress, August, 1988 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
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Due to a shortage of Iraqi Army troops who were needed
at the front, some 15,000 detribalized Iraqi Kurds known as
"Jash" were recruited by Baghdad to provide security along
the Iraq Oil Road to prevent pipeline sabotage by PUK, PKK
and splinter group forces. The Turks aided the effort on
their side of the border by encasing the pipeline in heavy
security (barbed wire, minefields, depopulating the area,
and shooting at anything that moved) . This cooperation was
important, because sabotage threatened from both sides
—
while PKK forces were taking refuge in the mountainous
regions of northern Iraq, PUK personnel and other anti-Ba'th
groups were hiding out across the border in Turkey. ^^^
Exports via Turkey, however, were not without a price.
Transit fees notwithstanding, the advantage obtained was
lessened when Turkey was slow to reimburse Iraq for oil
purchased via the pipeline. In the wake of the cease-fire,
the Kurdish threat, added to a desperate need for oil
revenues, will continue to make pipeline security important,
and may have been the reason for Iraq's aggressive post-war
actions against the Kurds.
Another Turkish-Iraqi issue with internal security
implications concerns water. Iraq is dependent upon the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers for much of her water resources.
The GAP project, discussed above, could result in the
Government Printing Office) , pp. 134-136.
229oiBallance, Gulf War , pp. 136-137.
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controlling or limiting of Euphrates water by Turkey, a move
which would affect Syria as well. Turkey has not denied
this possibility, since no treaties regarding water rights
exist between the nations. The issue of control of scarce
water resources has caused Turkey to be on the alert for
possible sabotage against GAP construction projects. ^-^^
This sabotage could well be internal, from PKK elements, but
should Turkey choose to restrict the flow of water to Syria
or Iraq, those Kurds with many years of experience crossing
the mountainous Turkish-Iraqi border could well play a role
in a sabotage effort conducted on behalf of their
governments, who may be compelled to put aside their
differences in the face of a water shortage that could
threaten their survival.
Recently, Turkey, perhaps in an effort to mitigate the
threat, has pursued a more conciliatory course with regard
to the issue of water resources. Prime Minister Turgut
Ozal, in a 27 September 1989 speech to the Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly, has proposed a "Peace Pipeline
Project" which would shift unused water resources via
pipeline to neighboring nations with more arid climates. ^-^-^
Ozal's speech did not specify which neighbors would receive
the benefits of this project, and it is likely that Turkey
230fbis, "DIE WELT Reports on Building of Ataturk Dam,"
12 November 1986, pp. T4-5.
2 31iipM Ozal addresses CEPA in Strasbourg," Newspot
Turkish Digest . 28 September 1989, pp. 1, 7.
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has concessions such as withdrawal of Syrian support for
Kurdish insurrectionists or reduced Iraqi oil prices in mind
when it promulgated the water distribution plan.
C. TURKEY AND IRAN
There are many phsyical and historical similarities
between Turkey and Iran. Both nations have a largely non-
Arab population, non-Arab languages (Ural-Altaic Turkish and
Indo-European Farsi, respectively) predominate in each
country, and both nations entered the modern age under the
strong leadership of charismatic rulers—Ataturk in Turkey,
and Reza Shah in Iran. The geographic juxtaposition of
these two nations has fostered cooperation over the years;
however, the 1979 revolution in Iran strained the once-close
relationship, as the secular Turkish government now
perceives the radically religious emphasis of the Islamic
Republic of Iran as having the potential to threaten the
internal security of Turkey.
During the years of Mohammed Reza Shah's rule, Iran was
careful to ensure that Turkey was notified of any domestic
security activities against the Kurdish population in Iran.
Each spring and autumn, almost as a rite, the Iranian Air
Force engaged in systematic bombing of Kurdish villages.
These "pacification" operations had become so regular that
the Turkish side would be given prior notice of the aerial
bombardments so as to avoid any misunderstandings over
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possible airspace infringements in this mountainous border
territory. ^-^^
The revolution in Iran, which was followed by fighting
between the Iranian Kurds and the new Islamic government,
came at a critical time in Turkey's history. The Turkish
government was facing major political and economic problems,
was threatened by terrorist activities and unrest from
several quarters, and could ill-afford further
destabilization in the form of a reaction to the events in
Iran by the Kurdish population in the eastern provinces.
The potential for Iranian "contamination" of the Kurds in
Turkey led General Evren, who had not yet engineered the
coup in Turkey, to declare martial law in six southeastern
provinces on 20 April 1979. This was followed by military
exercises in the Diyarbakir area by the army and the air
force as a show of strength. ^-^-^ On 12 September 1980,
General Evren took control of the troubled government in
Turkey. The new regime quickly took steps to eliminate
terrorist activities, which included a crackdown on PKK
Kurds in the southeast.
In October one of the biggest security operations was
directed against the so-called "Apocu" organisation of
left-wing Kurdish secessionists, and eight of the
ringleaders were killed. This success against the Kurdish
2 3 2iy[ehjuet Ali Birand, The General's Coup in Turkey; An
Inside Storv of 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey's Defence
Publishers, 1987), p. 68.
233Bij-and, General's Coup , p. 78.
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extremists received considerable prominence in the
media. . . ^34
More recently, Iranian-Turkish relationships have become
less cordial. The Kurds are central to the dispute. On 10
April 1988, Turkey announced that they would shoot down any
military aircraft entering Turkey illegally after Iranian
airplanes dropped bombs on the Turkish side of the border
while providing air support to Kurds entering Turkey from
Iran. 2 35 Turkey has indicated that they believe Iran is
aiding PKK forces, and that Kurdish forces are being trained
in two camps in Iran near the Turkish border. According to
one source, Iran has supplied PKK Kurds with civilian
identity cards and Iranian revolutionary guard uniforms.
Additionally, Turkey suspects that there is a strong
relationship between Hizbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon and
the PKK. 236
Iran, for its part, has publicly declared a distrust of
Turkey's secular government, accusing Turkey of being a pawn
of Saudi Arabia and the United States. This followed the
expulsion by Turkey of Hojatoleslam Sabri Hamedani, an imam
at an Iranian mosque in Istanbul, for statements strongly
234Kenneth Mackenzie, Turkey Under the Generals .
Conflict Studies, No. 126, January 1981 (London: Institute
for the Study of Conflict), p. 23.
235e];u^ Iran; Country Report . No. 2, 1988, p. 10.
236Reuters, "Turkey Believes Kurdish Rebels Forging
Closer...," SMPT Mail News Service, 14 October 1989, Ankara,
Turkey.
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critical of Saudi Arabia. The imam criticized the Saudis
for beheading 16 Kuwaiti Shiites who were implicated in
bombings in Mecca in July, 1989. The Turkish government
responded to the elder.ly imam's attack by hustling him onto
the first bus out of town, an action which the Iranians
contended was cruel, indicating that they felt he at least
should have been put on a plane instead. ^-^^
The decline in Iranian-Turkish diplomatic relations has
accompanied a similar recent decline in the trade
relationship between the two nations. In 1985, exports to
Iran from Turkey totalled $1078 million and imports were
$1265 million. One year later, these figures had dropped to
$564 million and $221 million, respectively. ^-^^ By 1987,
the Iranians had instituted fierce austerity measures which
resulted in a 95 percent reduction in the volume of goods
imported into Iran from Turkey. Even with this reduction,
Turkey continued to be one of the larger suppliers of
imports to Iran, along with West Germany, Japan, Italy and
the United Kingdom. ^-^^
Iran's recent conclusion of a ten year trade agreement
with Bulgaria, designed to produce up to $1 billion a year
in trade between the two nations, has also raised Turkey's
ire. Turkey has been struggling under the weight of
^^^Nicosia, "Iran Criticises Turkey," 10 October 1989.
^^Seiu^ Iran: Country Report . No. 3, 1987, p. 10.
239eju^ Iran: Country Report . No. 1, 1988, pp. 7, 16.
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hundreds of thousands of Bulgarian Turks who have crossed
into Turkey fleeing the so-called "Bulgarization" campaign
designed to eradicate their Turkish identity. Turkey is
irritated that Iran, as well as other Moslem nations who
have concluded agreements with Sofia such as Libya, Syria
and South Yemen, would place trade issues before the plight
of fellow Moslems facing persecution. To add insult to
injury, Iran subsequently offered its services as a mediator
between Bulgaria and Turkey. ^^^
Still, Turkey seems determined to keep its options open
as regards Iran. Although discussions regarding a possible
oil pipeline from Iran to the Mediterranean have yet to bear
fruit, they crop up on a regular basis. ^^-^ Iran continues
to purchase the lion's share of Turkey's fertilizer output,
an industry which earned Turkey $26 million in 1988 and is
projected to amount to revenues of $40 million in 1989.^^2
Additionally, Turkey's Council of Ministers has recently
ratified a protocol to export electricity to Iran. As part
of this protocol, the Turkish Electricity Board will
240j^^shtak Parker, "Turkey: Knowing Who Your Friends
Are," The Middle East . August 1989, p. 18.
241eiu, Iran; Country Report . No. 2 1988, p. 15.
242nuj-g3 Fertilizer Production," Newspot Turkish
Digest . 5 October 1989, p. 5.
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construct step-up transformer stations in Maku, Iran and
Dogubeyazit, Turkey. ^^-^
D. SYRIA
Syrian-Iraqi relations have never been cozy, as each
views the other's politics as a perversion of the original
Ba'thist ideology. The two nations' differences are often
expressed in the context of disputes which center around
either Syrian support for Iraq's Kurds or Syria's lack and
Iraq's abundance of petroleum. Similarly, Syrian-Turkish
relations have been marked by disagreements which range from
border disputes to accusations of interference in each's
internal affairs. Relations with Iran, by contrast, grew
warmer with the founding of the Islamic Republic, but more
recently have begun to show signs of strain.
Syria has a small Kurdish population, and has been
accused of funding, with Soviet help, PKK activities on both
sides of the Turkish-Iraqi border. Syria not only provided
sanctuary to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is wanted in
Turkey on a variety of charges, but also has provided
training for PKK forces. ^^^ Additionally, Syria provided
aid to the Kurds during the fighting in Iraq which preceded
the 1975 Algiers accord and support for Jalal Talabani's
243iig]Lectricity Energy Export to Iran," Newspot Turkish
Digest . 12 October 1989, p. 5.
^'^'^van Bruinessen, "Guerrilla War," Middle East Report .
July-August 1988, pp. 42, 44.
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left-leaning PUK, which was at ideological odds with
Barzani's KDP.245
Syria argued with Iraq over oil as far back as 1966,
when the Syrian government ceased pumping oil through the
pipeline crossing Syria to the Mediterranean in a dispute
with the IPC over transit fees. (The Syrians, in fact,
wanted Iraq to nationalize their oil industry so Damascus,
perhaps feeling cheated as one of the few Middle Eastern
countries without oil assets of their own, could charge
their Arab brothers even higher fees.) The dispute was
resolved in a few months, but it resulted in Iraq being made
aware of the vulnerability of pipeline delivery methods. ^^^^
The pipeline again became an issue during the Iran-Iraq war.
Syria, supporting Iran, refused to allow Iraq to use the
pipeline, a move designed to benefit Iran by threatening
Iraq's ability to continue funding the war.
Water delivery via the Euphrates river, discussed above,
could well be the issue that brings Syria and Iraq together.
Syria relies upon irrigation water from the Euphrates river,
and while Iraq enjoys the benefits of the Tigris, it is also
heavily dependent upon the Euphrates as well. Syria's water
supply, if allocated, reduced or held hostage by Turkey,
could well persuade that nation to put aside its differences
with Iraq and initiate a joint diplomatic or military
245Marr, Iraq , pp. 233, 236.
246siuglett, Iraq , pp. 99-100.
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venture to ensure continued access to the vital resource.
However, in the near term, rather than attempt rapprochement
Syria appears content to use the PKK as a "trump card" by
continuing to shelter Ocalan and permitting "the PKK to be a
serious nuisance to Turkey but not to the point of provoking
Ankara to take military measures against Syria. "^^^ It
remains to be seen if Turkey's recent proposal of a water
"peace pipeline" will mitigate the water resource issue and
result in Syria's distancing itself from the PKK in exchange
for a secure source of water.
More recently, Syria has begun to draw away from Iran, a
move which no doubt pleases Iraq. During the war, Syria
accepted gifts of petroleum in exchange for support of Iran
against Iraq, but more recently the Syrians have been
required to pay full market price. Differences centering
around the two nations' policies in Lebanon have contributed
to the strain in relations. ^^^^ The increasing isolation of
Iran vis-a-vis the Arab world has also been a factor in the
distancing of Damascus from Tehran.
E. ISRAEL
Israel's involvement in the Kurdish issue was primarily
motivated by the security threat posed to that nation by
Iraq, and the desire to obtain strategic advantage by
^'^'^van Bruinessen, "Guerrilla War," Middle East Report .
July-August, 1988, p. 44.
248EIU, Iran; Country Report . No. 2, 1988, p. 10
132
fostering closer relations with oil-rich, non-Arab Iran.
Iraq opposed the creation of the state of Israel, and
technically, the two nations have been at war with one
another since 1948. By contrast, Israel's dealings with
Turkey are marked by a studied avoidance of the Kurdish
issue, preferring instead to emphasize regional
similarities, as both nations are pro-western, non-Arab, and
have historically concerned themselves with countering
Soviet encroachment in the region.
Israel's relationship with Turkey is quiet but close.
Arms transfers to Turkey of weapons such as Israeli-made air
to surface missiles, antitank shells, machine guns and
ammunition have been taking place since the mid-1970s.
Additionally, Turkey has received intelligence training from
Israeli intelligence, and Israel's Mossad has maintained a
station in Turkey for more than thirty years. ^^^
Israel's sensitivity to Turkish government concerns over
minority issues extends to the "Armenian question." The
Turkish government maintains that there was no Armenian
genocide, per se, and that, subsequent to an Ottoman
government order to relocate the Armenians, civil war
erupted in which Moslem deaths far outnumbered Armenian
ones. Turkey objects not only to terms such as "massacre"
or "genocide" in describing the events that took place, but
^^^Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection; Who
Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p. 14.
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also resents that the Turkish government is being held
responsible for events that occurred in 1915, under an
Ottoman government. ^^^ Israel's approach to this issue is
sympathetic to the congerns of Turkey in that:
...the Israeli government forbids any mention of the
Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1915 in any government-
controlled media or government-sponsored activities. It
does not allow the showing of television programs dealing
with the events of 1915, and has taken actions against any
mention of the Armenian cause. Israeli schoolchildren
never hear about the Armenian holocaust, and the Israeli
Foreign Ministry makes every effort to prevent any public
or scholarly event that mentions what happened in 1915.
In 1982, even the International Conference on the
Holocaust and Genocide was a target of Foreign Ministry
displeasure and pressure, because the Armenian genocide
was also scheduled to be discussed. ^^^
Given the "kid gloves" treatment of this issue on the part
of the Israelis, it is unlikely that they would choose, at
least for the present, to jeopardize their friendly
relations by involving themselves in the equally-sensitive
Kurdish minority question in Turkey.
Israel, as noted previously, displayed far less
reticence in involving itself in Kurdish undertakings in
Iraq. Mullah Mustafa Barzani apparently visited Israel on
at least two occasions, in 1967 and 1973, and former Israeli
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was said to have met with Kurdish
250ipj^Q Turkish government's viewpoint is described in
detail in Erich Feigl, A Mvth of Terror. Armenian
Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context
(Freilassing, Austria: Edition Zeitgeschichte, 1986)
.
25lBeit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection , p. 17.
134
leaders in Tehran during a visit to Iran in 1966.^^2
Israel's support of Barzani's Kurds in Iraq prior to the
Algiers Accord, providing both weaponry and training, ^^-^ was
designed more to keep the Iraqi government busy rather than
support a freedom-loving and oppressed group. Indeed, the
extent of and duration of Israeli aid, valued at millions of
dollars and lasting for more than a decade, began with
assistance from Mossad as early as 1958 and was augmented in
1963 with "arms, ammunition, and Israeli military
advisors. "2^^ This was followed by "the rumored presence of
Israeli instructors among the Kurdish guerrillas"^^^ who
provided training courses to tebels in the Kurdish mountains
beginning in August, 1965. ^^^
Israel took their cues from Iran in providing aid to the
Kurds in Iraq. Israeli-Iranian relations became especially
close during the early 1960s and continued throughout the
Shah's reign. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic
ties, the Iranians maintained "an interests section in the
252Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection , p. 19.
253siuglett, "The Kurds," Saddam's Iraq , p. 197.
2543eit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection , p. 19.
255i^^I5^ McLaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin and Abraham R.
Wagner, Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East; Domestic
Influences on Policy in Egypt. Irag. Israel and Syria (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 136.
2563e-[t-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection , p. 19.
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Swiss embassy" while Israel maintained a de facto embassy in
Tehran. 2^^
During the Arab oil boycott, Iran quietly supplied oil
to Israel. Additionally, Israel's Mossad provided training
to the Shah's SAVAK. Arms deliveries from Israel to Iran
spanned both the Shah's and Khomeini's regimes. The
historical strength of the Israeli-Iranian relationship,
however, is best exemplified by an ambitious plan between
the two nations,
...to develop a long-range missile capable of carrying
nuclear warheads. The missile was the product of Israeli
research and development, starting in the late 1950s. In
the spring of 1977, Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres
signed a secret agreement in Tehran for the development of
a more advanced missile. Iran was to finance it through
the delivery of $1 billion worth of oil.... The project was
halted by the end of the shah's reign; its details were
revealed when the new Iranian regime published documents
found in the Israeli embassy building in Teheran. ... ^^^
Doubtless, Israel would be delighted with the creation
of an independent Kurdistan, but it is unlikely that this is
seen as a realistic possibility in the near future. Indeed,
the Kurdish affiliation with Israel, even more than with
non-Arab Iran, may have permanently tainted the Kurdish
autonomy movement from the point of view of neighboring
Arabs who might otherwise have developed some sympathy for
2^^Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection , pp. 9-10.
258Bei-t-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection , pp. 11-12,
citing M. Bailey, "The Blooming of Operation Flower,"
Observer . 2 February 1986 and E. Sciolino, "Documents Detail
Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah," New York Times . 1 April
1986a.
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their cause, perhaps motivated by disagreements with Saddam
Hussein.
Iraq, moving away from the Soviet Union and towards the
West, appears to be subtly moderating its stance towards
Israel. By participating in the 1982 Arab League Summit,
Iraq
...tacitly recognized Israel's right to exist in return
for the creation of a. .. Palestinian state. Saddam Husayn
went even further, stating that a condition of security
for Israel was necessary for a resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 2^^
Moderation by Iraq not only brought that nation closer to
the West, it also served to reduce the likelihood that
Israel would be interested in any near-term future funding
of the Kurds. The ever-pragmatic Israelis, though, would no
doubt attempt to renew their Kurdish relationships in Iraq
should that nation prove bellicose at some later date.
Despite the recent absence of sharp rhetoric by Iraq,
relations cannot be said to have thawed convincingly between
the two nations. This view is supported by one writer who
raised the possibility that Israel may have been behind the
downing of an airplane carrying an Algerian cease-fire
negotiating team flying near the Turkish-Iranian border in
1981, in a precautionary effort to keep the Iran-Iraq war
going. ^^^
259Marr, Iraq , pp. 305-306.
260o'Ballance, Gulf War , p. 104
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F. SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia's relationships with Iran, Iraq and Turkey
have changed over the years. Saudi Arabia's principal
concern regarding these countries is to ensure that they
maintain either a stable regime friendly to them, or should
a nation prove belligerent, work to isolate it from its
neighbors in the region. In the case of Iraq and Turkey,
the former formula has been successful, but the strained
relationship with Iran has necessitated implementation of
the latter tactic. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to involve
itself in the Kurdish issue, even in radical Iran, for two
reasons: first, the possibility that sponsorship of Kurdish
insurrection in Iran could spread to friendly Turkey and
Iraq, and second, the non-Arab heritage of the Kurds
provides little motivation for an offer of aid. Instead,
the Saudis have tended to influence events using either
cold, hard cash or the oil weapon—offering financial aid to
friendly nations such as Iraq and Turkey, while undercutting
bellicose Iran by refusing to cut back oil production,
resulting in a lower world price for oil and reducing Iran's
profits in the face of desperate need for revenues.
During the Pahlavi era, Iran and Saudi Arabia often
disagreed regarding regional security issues, but cooperated
in other areas. Not only were they among the original
founders of OPEC in 1960, but in the succeeding two decades
the two nations initiated several economic and industrial
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agreements, negotiated an accord regarding the seabed and
continental shelf of the Persian Gulf in 1968, and organized
the 1969 Islamic Summit Conference in Morocco. ^^^ Since the
fall of the Shah, however, Iran's hostile attitude towards
the Saudi regime, its radical Shiite posture and largely
non-Arab population leave the Saudis disinclined to offer
aid to that nation. Diplomatic relations with Iran were
terminated in April, 1988, after Iranian agitation during
the 1987 Hajj resulted in riots and hundreds of deaths, and
Iran refused to ensure that pilgrims refrained from similar
activities during the 1988 Hajj. Indeed, Ayatollah Khomeini
told pilgrims they had an obligation to demonstrate
—
compelling Saudi Arabia to sever ties in order to ensure
security during the annual pilgrimage. ^^^
Saudi Arabia is unique in "that it is the only major
pro-Western state with significant influence"^^-^ in Iraq.
The two nations share much in common: significant oil
reserves, a common border, a predominantly Arab heritage and
strong, centralized, and Sunni leadership. These factors,
as well as strategic Saudi Arabian aid to Iraq, contributed
to the lessening of hostile rhetoric by Baghdad in the late
26lNyrop, Iran, pp. 63, 236-237, 446.
262eiu^ Iran: Country Report . No. 2, 1988, pp. 9-10.
263Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for
Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in
the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 33.
139
7 0s and an increase in cooperation between the two
nations. ^^^
This cooperation manifested itself in Saudi Arabia's
unsuccessful diplomatic attempts to convince Syria to reopen
the pipeline transiting that country from Iraq to the
Mediterranean in an effort to aid Iraq's economy during the
war.^^^ Saudi initiatives in the form of economic pressures
were somewhat more successful in encouraging Syria to
"distance itself from Iran" in order to avoid "hurting the
Arab cause. "^^^ Additionally, Saudi Arabia gave Iraq a
quiet gift of some "350,000 BPD of oil to market in late
1982" to help with war deficits. ^67 These gifts of oil
continued throughout the course of the war.
Perhaps the most recent visible evidence of Saudi
Arabian contributions to Iraq's internal security are IPSA 1
and 2. IPSA is an acronym for Iraq's Pipeline in Saudi
Arabia. IPSA 1, which terminates at the Saudi Arabia
Petrol ine, has been completed and has a current volume of .5
mmbd. IPSA 2 is under construction and completion is
anticipated by late 1989 or early 1990. It is expected to
have a capacity of 1.6 mmbd and will run parallel to IPSA 1
and the Petrol ine, terminating at Yanbu on the Red Sea.
264cordesman, Gulf , pp. 35, 421, 758.
"^^^l/ia-rr , Iraq , p. 298.
266eiu, Iran; Country Report . No. 4, 1987, p. 15
^^'^cordesman. Gulf , p. 758.
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These pipelines greatly enhance Iraq's ability to gain
foreign revenues despite a lack of access to the Persian
Gulf. 268
Saudi Arabia's motives in aiding Iraq are not completely
altruistic. By taking the lead in emphasizing collective
security, regional diplomacy, and maintaining stability in
the area, Saudi Arabia lessens the likelihood of what could
be potentially destabilizing superpower interference.
(Indeed, a rumor circulated in the early years of the war
that the Saudis were actively seeking to engineer the
replacement of Saddam Hussein because of his poor
performance in prosecuting the fight against the radical
regime in Iran.269j Further, Iraq, like other nations in
the region who rely on generous Saudi financial or
logistical aid, has a stake in the continuance of the
present Saudi regime.
Turkey, too, shares common points with Saudi Arabia.
Although not an Arab nation, Turkey maintains a pro-western
stance and is possessed of a largely Sunni population.
Turkey has received aid from Saudi Arabia, considers that
nation a friend, and has little tolerance for vehement
criticism of its benefactor within its borders. This has
268GAO, Energy Security , pp. 3 4-36.
269jabr Muhsin, "The Gulf War," Committee Against
Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, Saddam's Iraq;
Revolution or Reaction? (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1986), p.
235.
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moved Iran to accuse Turkey of being a pawn of the west (see
Section C, above)
.
One important Turkish export to Saudi Arabia is labor.
Between 1966 and 1989, at least 222,175 Turks have been
employed in various capacities in Saudi Arabia. This figure
is second only to West Germany, which has hosted more than
500,000 guestworkers during the same period. The trend in
labor export has been shifting towards the Arab world in
recent years, with approximately 97 percent of migration to
Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq.^^^ This relationship will
have continued significance for as long as Turkey has a
surplus labor force and receipts from expatriate workers
constitute an important source of foreign exchange.
G. OTHER REGIONAL ACTORS
Relationships between the three nations with significant
Kurdish populations and other regional actors has, in the
last decade, been a function of the regional actor's
position vis a vis the Iran-Iraq war. The Kurdish issue,
with the exception of Syrian interest, has not played a
large role. Turkey, as a neutral in that conflict, was able
to maintain relationships with nations as diverse as Saudi
Arabia and Libya, but the support of other nations in the
area was largely a function of a unified Arab effort whose
purpose was to defeat a radical, non-Arab enemy.
27 0nj^anpower Export Deployed to Arab Countries,"
Newspot Turkish Digest . 12 October 1989, p. 5.
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Iraq has, in the past, had differences with its Arab
neighbors. However, when Iraq's internal security was
threatened when Iran appeared to be gaining the upper hand,
most of the regional Arab powers, the notable exceptions
being Syria and Libya (who supported Iran)
,
provided backing
to Iraq, loaning money, materials or outlets to the sea in
order that Iraq could continue the war.
Iraq's relationship with Egypt has evolved over time.
Egypt, once a pariah in the Arab world in the aftermath of
Camp David, received some of its worst criticism from Iraq.
The relationship has since warmed. Egypt supplied Iraq with
spare military parts during the war,^^-"- Egyptian pilots who
acted as trainers and advisors, ^^^ and also supplied a large
percentage of foreign workers, many of whom worked in the
troubled agricultural sector. ^^-^ Anwar Sadat, prior to his
assassination, gave Saddam Hussein peinmission to conscript
these foreign workers to help the Iraqi war effort. ^^^
Jordan offered help to Iraq as well during the Iran-Iraq
war, "(providing) routes to 'Aqabah on the Red Sea' over
^^iMarr, Iraq , pp. 298, 305.
2'72oiBallance, Gulf War , p. 105.
^^Sceiine Whittleton, "Oil and the Iraqi Economy",
Saddam's Iraq , p. 60.
2'74]y[uhsin, "The Gulf War," Saddam's Iraq , p. 235,
citing Foreign Report , the Economist Newspaper Ltd, London,
6 May 1982.
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which 500,000 b/d of oil were transported in ISSS'^^^S ^g
well as opening that port to Iraqi shipping. Additionally,
Jordan sent a brigade of troops to guard Iraqi installations
which freed Iraqi troops for battle. Jordan also offered
the services of two armored divisions comprised of
approximately 20,000 troops, but the offer was politely
refused. 2^^ Iraq did accept military and technical advice
from Jordan at the start of the war, and by 1983, Iraq was
borrowing from Jordan to help defray the rising costs of the
protracted struggle. ^^^
Other regional actors put aside differences with Iraq as
well. Kuwait, for example, shipped Iraqi oil out of its
port "and the Gulf states. . .which, while anxious to prevent
the spread of Khumaini's message among their own population,
were initially not entirely averse to Iraq's being
considerably weakened by the conflict," in the end
contributed significant sums to the Iraqi war chest. ^^^
2'75Marr, Iraq , p. 305.
276o'Ballance, Gulf War , p. 105.
2'77cordesman, Gulf, pp. 399, 758
^^Ssiuglett, Iraq , p. 259.
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X. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to draw decisive conclusions from this
research due to its scope. The "Kurdish question" in Iraq,
Turkey and Iran will likely remain unanswered for some time
to come. However, what this research does suggest is that
any degree of increase in the development and/or
exploitation of strategic resources by governments is but
one of many factors which has influenced and will continue
to play a role in the intensity of Kurdish nationalist
activity.
In Iraq, increased government control of oil assets
began in the 1960s and was followed by nationalization of
the oil industry in the 1970s. As a result of this action
and a rise in the price of oil in the early 1970s,
substantial revenues accrued to the government. During the
same timeframe, a growing government interest in the success
of the agricultural sector resulted in greater mechanization
and larger farms in an effort to foster efficiency. The
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq provided some of its
fiercest and most unified opposition between 1960 and 1975,
and was overcome by the well-equipped Iraqi army only when
it lost its principal source of support. More recently,
attacks by Iraqi forces against Kurdish villages suggest an
economic dimension. These actions have been concentrated in
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areas containing vital resources, such as pipelines,
railways and highways, and where additional development is
planned.
In Turkey, the increased development of the southeastern
region began after 1960 and increased in magnitude through
the present day with the commencement of construction of the
ambitious GAP project. These events coincided with a
reawakening of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey.
The movement became more cohesive in the 1970s and
increasingly violent, owing primarily to the activities of
the PKK, in the 198 0s.
In Iran, the Kurdish area remains largely undeveloped.
Half-hearted efforts over the years at agricultural reform
were largely viewed as failures. For years, the Naft-i-Shah
oil field and Kermanshah refinery were the only (albeit now
ancient) evidence of industrial progress in the region.
While they are relatively unimportant to Iran's oil industry
today, they held a much more prominent position in the
government's domestic oil distribution and development
schemes in the immediate post-war era, which was marked by
the 1946-47 ill-fated attempt to establish a Kurdish
Republic at Mahabad. Today, despite a renewed outburst of
nationalist fervor which followed the fall of the Shah, the
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran is no closer to its
goal of autonomy than it was ten years ago. The movement
lacks cohesion and the Islamic Republic of Iran has largely
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succeeded in, if not crushing it, dividing and containing it
in order to use it against itself and Iran's neighbors for
the government's own ends.
In addition to development of resources, other factors
affect the Kurdish nationalists prospects for the future.
While the Kurds are regarded by some as a potentially
destabilizing factor in the region, they enjoy the sympathy
and support of those who attach an importance to democratic
and liberal ideals such as self-determination, "concern for
minority rights and ... distrust of central government
interference. "2^^
Urbanization will also affect the movement in the years
ahead. As the Kurdish population in Iran, Iraq and Turkey
continues to migrate from the countryside to the urban
areas, greater numbers of Kurds will be exposed to greater
opportunities for higher education which will serve to raise
their political consciousness. Despite the often vigorous
attempts to crush the Kurdish nationalist movements by the
central governments of the three nations, it is possible
that the historical resilience and strong cultural identity
of the Kurds will motivate them to continue to press their
demands through the use of armed struggle. Alternatively,
education and assimilation could translate into a more
moderate, political approach within the framework of
existing government systems.
2'79sim, Kurdistan , p. 21.
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Government use of force to control the Kurdish
population will likely continue in the years ahead in
varying degrees. In Iraq, the Baath government has had some
success in quieting the Kurds with armed troops and
deportation measures, and has even resorted to the use of
chemical weapons against Kurdish villagers. The Kurdish
movement in Iraq has been fragmented since the death of
Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1979, unlike the movement in
Turkey, which gained cohesion, determination and a radical
outlook in the face of strong government countermeasures.
In Iran, the movement, already fractured, still struggles to
recover from the assassination of Abdul Rahman Ghasemlou.
Superpower involvement is a factor which is unlikely to
have an impact on the Kurdish nationalist movement in the
near future. Given the current state of affairs in the
above-mentioned countries, it is unlikely that the United
States will involve itself in Kurdish affairs to the extent
that it did in the 1970s.
First, the revelations of the Pike Report make the U.S.
an untrustworthy ally from a Kurdish point of view, though
the Kurds would likely accept U.S. aid (in the improbable
event that it was offered) provided no strings were
attached. It is also likely that, if aid were offered, no
Kurdish movement would rely on American support to the
extent that Barzani did.
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Second, U.S. relationships with the nations of Iran,
Iraq and Turkey will doubtless continue to take priority
over Kurdish interests, at least in the near term. With the
death of Khomeini in Iran, the U.S. remains optimistic that
normalization of relations will take place at some future
date. American security interests in Turkey will also
continue to take precedence over Kurdish nationalist aims or
human rights abuses in that country, provided that
government actions against PKK "terrorists" do not result in
widespread, excessively brutal or unacceptably flagrant
repression of the Kurdish population as a whole. In Iraq, a
similar situation exists—as that nation continues to
rebuild following the war with Iran, American business as
well as diplomatic interests in that country will be at the
forefront of American initiatives.
Third, American interests in the Kurdish issue have
historically encompassed the dimension of competition with
the Soviet Union for influence in the region. The Soviet
Union is still recovering from their debacle in Afghanistan,
and is also faced with ethnic unrest and economic problems
on their homefront. These events will likely make them more
cautious and any Soviet initiatives in the region will more
probably be diplomatic in nature rather than clandestine.
However, one cannot completely rule out Soviet interference
in Kurdish nationalist aspirations should a golden
opportunity arise.
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. . .Moscow has staked a modest investment in Kurdish
affairs. Students currently research Kurdish problems in
Moscow, Leningrad, Erivan, Baku, Tblissi and Tashkent—
a
greater number than in any other country. However Soviet
sponsorship of Kurdish forces is more likely to remain
merely mischievous: an independent Kurdistan might well
show a spirit of independence not consistent with overall
Soviet policies and might even fall under Western
influence. ^®^
Long-term prospects for Kurdish nationalist aims will
depend upon four important factors. The most important of
these is the international climate. The superpowers appear
to be expressing an interest in threat reduction measures
such as arms control and elimination of chemical weapons, as
well as a concern for quality of life issues such as the
eradication of world hunger and improvement of the
environment. The success of these initiatives is by no
means certain, and only time will tell if the world becomes
more oriented towards issues which express a concern for
human rights and democratic ideals. If this is indeed the
case, the Kurdish struggle may finally come to the sustained
attention of the world and move public opinion to support
them in their efforts to achieve cultural expression, if not
autonomy. If the latter occurs, it will most likely be in
the context of a limited form of autonomy within the
existing boundaries of the countries involved.
The second factor is the governments of the nations with
significant Kurdish populations. Resolution of the "Kurdish
question" requires active and sincere government
280Sim, Kurdistan , p. 21.
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participation in mediation efforts. This will only take
place when the cost of quieting the Kurds by other means
becomes unacceptably expensive, either monetarily or in the
number of lives lost.
The third factor concerns the splintered nature of the
Kurdish nationalist movement. The solidarity which was so
strongly in evidence during the heady days of the Mahabad
Republic has, over time, dissolved into bitter feuding and
infighting which places ideological differences ahead of
nationalism and has divided the factions into mere pawns on
the regional chessboard. As long as the Kurds continue to
argue amongst themselves, they will be unable to press their
demands in an effective and compelling manner.
A final factor concerns the increasing level of
violence, much of it directed against their own countrymen,
primarily associated with the Kurdish nationalist movement
in Turkey. For the present, they are becoming better known
as a result of PKK terrorist activities. For the long term,
the movement will suffer reverses if the Kurds continue to
be portrayed as terrorists. Like the Palestinians, who
gained notoriety through terrorism but were unable to
achieve any progress until they moderated their stance and
united under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, the Kurds too
must unite behind a compelling spokesman who will be able to
define and articulate their goals to bring the support of
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